## Facts

- Needville Independent School District (NISD) enforced a grooming code requiring boys’ hair to be cut above the collar, earlobes, and eyes.
- A.A., a kindergarten student, wore long hair based on sincerely held Native American religious and cultural beliefs; his family believed cutting his hair was religiously and culturally impermissible.
- Because A.A.’s hair length violated the policy, NISD offered an exception only if A.A. wore his hair in a bun or tucked inside his shirt at school and school-related activities.
- A.A.’s family asserted that requiring him to bind or conceal his hair interfered with their religious practice, which included wearing long hair visibly.
- A.A., through his mother, sued NISD and related officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the First Amendment, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA), the Texas Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The district court ruled for A.A., concluding the policy as applied violated TRFRA and the First Amendment, and permanently enjoined enforcement of the grooming policy against him.
- NISD appealed, challenging liability and the scope of the injunction.

## Issues

1. Whether NISD’s grooming policy, including the bun/tucked-hair condition, imposed a substantial burden on A.A.’s exercise of religion under TRFRA.
2. If a substantial burden existed, whether NISD proved the policy was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest under TRFRA.
3. Whether the policy, as applied, violated the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and related state constitutional protections.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment and permanent injunction.
- The court held that the grooming policy, including the bun/tucked-hair requirement, substantially burdened A.A.’s religious exercise under TRFRA.
- The court held NISD failed to prove a compelling interest justifying enforcement against A.A. on the evidentiary record presented.
- The court held NISD also failed to prove the policy was the least restrictive means, given the lack of concrete harms and the availability of less restrictive accommodations.
- Because TRFRA provided a sufficient basis to affirm, the court treated the statutory ruling as dispositive and did not rely heavily on resolving the constitutional claims.

## Legal Principles

- Under TRFRA, government may not substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion unless it demonstrates that the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so.
- A substantial burden exists where government action pressures an adherent to modify behavior and violate religious beliefs, or conditions a benefit on compliance that conflicts with religious practice.
- Courts may assess the sincerity of asserted religious beliefs but do not evaluate the correctness or centrality of the practice within a faith tradition.
- An offered “accommodation” that still requires concealment or significant alteration of religious expression may itself constitute a substantial burden.
- Under TRFRA strict scrutiny, generalized or speculative assertions of discipline, safety, hygiene, or avoidance of distraction are insufficient without record support tying enforcement to concrete harms and showing the absence of less restrictive alternatives.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit upheld an injunction preventing a school district from enforcing a boys’ hair-length policy against a kindergarten student whose sincere religious practice required long, visibly worn hair, holding that the district’s concealment-based exception substantially burdened religious exercise and was not justified under TRFRA’s compelling-interest and least-restrictive-means requirements.


A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010)