## Facts

- Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, born Ferdinand Lewis “Lew” Alcindor, played college and early professional basketball under the name “Lew Alcindor.”
- In 1971, after converting to Islam, he legally changed his name to Kareem Abdul-Jabbar and did not thereafter use “Lew Alcindor” for commercial purposes.
- General Motors Corporation and its advertising agency, Leo Burnett, aired a 1993 television commercial for the Oldsmobile Eighty-Eight during the NCAA men’s basketball tournament.
- The commercial presented “trivia” and displayed the text “You’re Talking to the Champ,” then identified the tournament’s most outstanding player record-holder as “Lew Alcindor, UCLA, ’67, ’68, ’69.”
- The commercial juxtaposed that sports record with claims about the Oldsmobile Eighty-Eight’s “Best Buy” recognition and price, and concluded with promotional slogans.
- Defendants did not obtain Abdul-Jabbar’s consent and did not compensate him for use of the name “Lew Alcindor.”
- Abdul-Jabbar sued alleging Lanham Act § 43(a) false endorsement and California statutory and common-law right of publicity violations.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, reasoning Abdul-Jabbar had “abandoned” the name “Lew Alcindor” and that the ad could not reasonably be read as an endorsement.

## Issues

1. Whether use of Abdul-Jabbar’s former name in a commercial could constitute false endorsement under Lanham Act § 43(a) by creating a likelihood of consumer confusion as to his sponsorship or approval.
2. Whether nonuse of the former name for many years constituted “abandonment” eliminating Abdul-Jabbar’s ability to assert Lanham Act and California publicity-based claims.
3. Whether defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on nominative/descriptive use or “newsworthiness/incidental use” theories given the commercial context.
4. Whether California statutory and common-law right of publicity claims can reach commercial use of a celebrity’s former name and associated achievements without consent.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment and remanded for trial.
- The court rejected defendants’ abandonment theory; Abdul-Jabbar’s identity associated with his birth name was not extinguished by his legal name change and later nonuse of the former name.
- The court held there was a genuine dispute of material fact whether the advertisement implied Abdul-Jabbar’s endorsement, making likelihood of confusion a jury question under Lanham Act § 43(a).
- The court held triable issues also existed under California statutory and common-law right of publicity because the commercial used Abdul-Jabbar’s identity for advertising without consent.

## Legal Principles

- Lanham Act § 43(a) reaches false endorsement where use of a person’s name or persona in advertising may mislead consumers into believing the person sponsors or approves the product.
- Likelihood of consumer confusion as to sponsorship or endorsement is typically a fact issue unsuitable for summary judgment when reasonable jurors could differ on the ad’s message.
- A celebrity’s prior name and persona are not “abandoned” in the manner of a trademark merely because the celebrity adopts a new name or stops exploiting the former name commercially.
- Nominative/descriptive reference and newsworthiness-type defenses do not justify summary judgment where the use is embedded in an advertisement and the overall presentation could be understood as trading on a celebrity’s identity.
- California’s statutory (Cal. Civ. Code § 3344) and common-law rights of publicity can protect against unauthorized commercial use of a celebrity’s identity, including a former name closely associated with recognizability and achievements.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit held that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the theory that Abdul-Jabbar had abandoned his former name, and that a jury could find the commercial’s use of “Lew Alcindor” and related achievements implied a false endorsement and violated California publicity rights, requiring a trial.


Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996)