## Facts

- James and Amanda Turknett owned disputed Eddy County property in fee simple.
- In 1908, they executed separate “conditional deeds” granting Beulah Turknett Jones and Ruby Turknett Jones life estates in separate parcels.
- Each 1908 deed provided that at the daughter’s death the property would vest in her “heir or heirs,” defined as her children if any survived her; if she died without children, the property would vest in her estate.
- When the 1908 deeds were delivered, neither daughter was married and neither had children.
- The parents later executed additional deeds, including a 1911 deed to Beulah purporting to convey “absolute title,” a 1916 deed to Beulah covering part of the same property, and a corrective deed to Ruby.
- After the parental deeds, Beulah had three children and Ruby had four children.
- Beulah and Ruby later attempted to convey fee simple interests to Abo’s predecessors in interest, who held oil and gas interests.
- Abo claimed fee simple title through the later deeds and a merger theory; the children claimed they held remainder interests created by the 1908 deeds.

## Issues

1. What estates and future interests were created by the 1908 deeds.
2. Whether the parents retained a reversionary interest after the 1908 deeds and could convey it by later deeds.
3. Whether later conveyances to the life tenants caused a merger that destroyed the children’s contingent remainders under the common-law doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders.
4. Whether New Mexico should apply (or reject) the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders.

## Decision

- The court held the 1908 deeds created life estates in Beulah and Ruby, contingent remainders in their children, and a reversion in the parents.
- The court assumed the parents retained a reversion and that later deeds could convey some or all of that remaining interest.
- The court refused to apply the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders and held the children’s contingent remainders were not destroyed by any merger.
- The court abolished the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders in New Mexico.
- The court reversed the summary judgment for Abo, concluding Abo’s chain of title derived no more than the life estates held by Beulah and Ruby as against their children’s remainder interests.

## Legal Principles

- A grant “to A for life, then to A’s children if any at A’s death” creates a life estate in A and a contingent remainder in the children where the takers are unascertained and the remainder is conditioned on survival to A’s death.
- The grantor retains a reversion when the future interest may fail and the property would otherwise return to the grantor (or pass as provided if the contingency does not occur).
- New Mexico does not apply the common-law doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders; contingent remainders are not eliminated merely because the prior freehold estate terminates or is claimed to merge with a reversion.
- A conveyance cannot, by merger and destructibility, enlarge a life tenant’s interest into a fee simple in a way that defeats contingent remainder interests created by the original grant.

## Conclusion

The court rejected Abo’s merger-based fee title theory, held that the 1908 deeds created life estates with contingent remainders in the daughters’ children, and abolished destructibility of contingent remainders in New Mexico, leaving Abo with no greater interest than the life estates conveyed through Beulah and Ruby.


Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 93 N.M. 332, 600 P.2d 278 (N.M. 1979)