## Facts

- Sandra Adickes, a white schoolteacher working with Black students in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, entered a Kress variety store with six Black students shortly after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 took effect.
- After purchasing school supplies, the group went to the store’s lunch counter, where Adickes alleged she was refused service because she was white and accompanied by Black students.
- Adickes alleged that the refusal reflected a local practice of segregating public eating places and that Mississippi’s criminal trespass statute functioned as an enforcement mechanism.
- She further alleged a policeman was present in the store at the time of the refusal and that the refusal of service and her later arrest were the product of an understanding between the store and police.
- After leaving the store, Adickes was arrested on a vagrancy charge, which she alleged was retaliatory and racially motivated.
- She sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on two theories: (1) a state-enforced “custom or usage” denying equal protection and (2) a conspiracy/joint action between Kress and police to cause the refusal and arrest.

## Issues

1. Whether summary judgment for Kress on the § 1983 conspiracy/joint-action claim was proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
2. Whether a directed verdict against Adickes on the § 1983 “custom or usage” theory applied an unduly restrictive view of what must be shown to establish actionable state involvement.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded.
- Summary judgment for Kress on the conspiracy count was improper because the moving party did not carry its Rule 56 burden to show the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact.
- The alleged presence and participation of a policeman in the store was a material fact because joint participation with a state official could supply the state action required for § 1983.
- Kress’s submissions left gaps and did not foreclose reasonable inferences favorable to Adickes (including the possibility an officer was present during the refusal and that an understanding existed).
- The Court indicated error in the disposition of the “custom or usage” count and remanded for further proceedings rather than ending the claim by directed verdict on the evidentiary record.

## Legal Principles

- A Rule 56 movant bears the burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact; the burden is not met merely by pointing to perceived deficiencies in the nonmovant’s evidence.
- The nonmoving party’s duty to respond with specific evidentiary materials under Rule 56(e) arises only after the movant has properly supported the motion and carried its initial burden.
- Private parties who are jointly engaged with state officials in prohibited conduct act “under color of” law for § 1983 purposes.
- Evidence permitting a reasonable inference of an understanding between a private actor and police can be material to establishing state action and defeating summary judgment.
- Claims premised on a state-enforced discriminatory custom should not be removed from the jury by an overly restrictive conception of “custom or usage” where circumstantial evidence could support state involvement.

## Conclusion

The Court held that Kress was not entitled to summary judgment because it failed to negate material factual inferences supporting a § 1983 conspiracy/joint-action theory, and it remanded for trial on that claim and further proceedings on the state-enforced custom theory.


Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)