## Facts

- Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff was a Philadelphia law partnership that employed Epstein, Weisbord, Wolf, and Jablon as salaried associates working on firm clients’ matters under partner supervision.
- While still employed, the associates planned to open a competing firm, including securing office space, signing a lease, and arranging financing.
- To obtain a $150,000 bank line of credit, the associates provided a list of 88 pending matters with projected fees exceeding $500,000; the matters were firm cases on which they had worked and were not their personal cases.
- After Epstein’s employment ended, he continued using the former firm’s offices for a short period and, during that time and shortly thereafter, began contacting the firm’s existing clients with open matters.
- Defendants made direct telephone and in-person contacts and sent targeted mailings to those clients, advising they were leaving and urging clients to terminate existing contingent-fee agreements with the firm and retain the new firm, sometimes including forms to switch counsel.
- The firm sued in equity for intentional interference with existing contractual relations and sought an injunction to stop the solicitation of its current clients for pending matters.

## Issues

1. Whether defendants’ targeted solicitation of the firm’s existing clients with pending matters, aimed at inducing termination of existing fee agreements, constituted intentional interference with contractual relations supporting injunctive relief.
2. Whether the solicitation campaign was protected commercial speech under the First Amendment, barring tort liability and equitable relief.

## Decision

- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and directed reinstatement of the trial court’s injunction.
- The court held that defendants intentionally and improperly interfered with the firm’s existing attorney-client fee contracts by soliciting clients to terminate and transfer pending matters to defendants’ new firm.
- The court rejected the First Amendment defense, concluding that commercial-speech protection for attorney advertising did not immunize targeted solicitation used as part of tortious interference.

## Legal Principles

- Intentional interference with contract is established where a defendant intentionally and improperly induces a third party not to perform an existing contract, causing harm; the analysis follows Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766.
- A client’s right to discharge counsel does not eliminate liability for a third party’s intentional, improper inducement of termination of an existing attorney-client contract.
- First Amendment protection of lawyer advertising does not bar civil liability or injunctive relief when speech is employed as part of conduct that is tortious in character; general truthful advertising is distinct from targeted solicitation directed at another firm’s clients with active matters.
- Equitable relief may issue to prevent ongoing or continuing harm to existing contractual relations and goodwill, while still allowing legitimate competition and non-tortious announcements of availability.

## Conclusion

The court held that departing associates who orchestrated a targeted campaign to persuade their former firm’s current clients to terminate existing fee agreements and transfer pending cases committed intentional interference with contractual relations, and that such solicitation was not insulated by commercial-speech doctrine; reinstatement of an injunction was therefore proper.


Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978)