## Facts

- Two minor children, Kimberly and Joyce, shared the same mother but had different fathers.
- While the children lived with their mother, a man who fathered Joyce (and another child with the mother) frequently stayed at or used the mother’s home and was regularly present.
- The Probate and Family Court found that both children were victims of sexual and emotional abuse and neglect while in the mother’s care.
- Evidence included the mother’s acknowledgment that she believed the man had sexually abused the children, family testimony describing sexualized behavior by the children, and therapeutic evidence supporting that abuse occurred.
- The trial judge found the children feared the man and that the mother repeatedly prioritized maintaining the relationship over protecting the children.
- In November 1988, the children were removed from the mother’s home and placed with Kimberly’s paternal grandparents, where they remained long-term.
- In January 1989, a District Court adjudicated the children in need of care and protection.
- DSS petitioned the Probate and Family Court to dispense with the mother’s consent to adoption under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210, § 3; the adoption plan contemplated adoption by the paternal grandparents.
- After trial, the Probate and Family Court found the mother currently unfit, approved the adoption plan, dispensed with consent, terminated parental rights, and allowed conditional visitation.

## Issues

1. Whether clear and convincing evidence supported findings of the mother’s current unfitness and that dispensing with consent to adoption was in the children’s best interests, notwithstanding claims that the evidence was “stale.”
2. Whether alleged failures by DSS to provide timely and appropriate services to preserve or reunify the family required reversal.
3. Whether evidentiary rulings (including use of hearsay) and the judge’s questioning of witnesses constituted reversible error or denied due process.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments dispensing with the mother’s consent to adoption and terminating her parental rights.
- The court held the findings of current unfitness and best interests were supported by clear and convincing evidence; past conduct remained probative of present fitness and future risk.
- The court held that any deficiencies in DSS services did not bar termination where the statutory standard was otherwise met and the judge remained responsible for deciding the children’s best interests.
- The court held the challenged evidentiary rulings and judicial questioning did not amount to prejudicial error or a due process violation.

## Legal Principles

- Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210, § 3, a court may dispense with parental consent to adoption upon clear and convincing evidence of current parental unfitness and that termination is in the child’s best interests.
- The child’s best interests are the dominant consideration, including the need for stable, continuous, and nurturing relationships.
- A parent’s past conduct may support a finding of current unfitness if it has probative value regarding present capacity and the likelihood of future harm; evidence is not excluded as “stale” merely because it relates to earlier events.
- DSS should provide reasonable services aimed at preserving or reunifying families, but shortcomings in services do not remove the judge’s duty to decide best interests and do not preclude termination if unfitness is otherwise proven.
- Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for prejudicial error; hearsay admitted without objection may be considered, and judicial questioning is permissible if it does not show bias or deny a fair hearing.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights and dispensed with her consent to adoption because clear and convincing evidence showed current unfitness and that adoption by the paternal grandparents served the children’s best interests; alleged agency service deficiencies and claimed evidentiary or procedural errors did not warrant reversal.


Adoption of Kimberly, 414 Mass. 526, 609 N.E.2d 73 (Mass. 1993)