## Facts

- Vito was born in January 1992 and tested positive for cocaine at birth.
- The Massachusetts Department of Social Services (DSS) placed Vito with foster parents about a month after birth; he lived with them continuously as his preadoptive parents.
- Vito never lived with his biological mother and had minimal contact with her during his early years.
- DSS petitioned under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210, § 3 to dispense with the mother’s consent to adoption.
- The Probate and Family Court found the mother unfit but denied DSS’s petition because DSS’s adoption plan did not provide significant postadoption contact with the mother and biological siblings; the judge indicated she would consider a plan including substantial visitation conditioned on sobriety and the child’s interests.
- The Appeals Court vacated the denial and directed entry of a decree allowing DSS’s petition, while stating that postadoption visitation could be considered in a new hearing due to the passage of time.
- The Supreme Judicial Court granted further review to address whether, and how, a judge may require postadoption contact in a § 3 proceeding.

## Issues

1. Whether a Probate and Family Court judge has equitable authority, in a proceeding under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210, § 3, to order postadoption visitation or contact between an adopted child and biological relatives.
2. Whether the judge erred by denying DSS’s § 3 petition based on the absence of significant postadoption contact in the adoption plan, despite findings of parental unfitness and the child’s attachments.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court held that a Probate and Family Court judge may, in equity and in the child’s best interests, order limited postadoption contact in a § 3 proceeding.
- The court concluded that the statutory framework for voluntary postadoption contact agreements did not eliminate or restrict the court’s traditional equitable authority.
- The court ruled that the probate judge’s denial of DSS’s petition, based on demanding extensive postadoption visitation on these facts, was clearly erroneous.
- The court vacated the order denying the petition and directed that a decree enter allowing DSS to dispense with parental consent, subject to any further proceedings the judge might order consistent with the opinion.

## Legal Principles

- In proceedings under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210, § 3, the court assesses both parental fitness and whether termination and the proposed adoption plan serve the child’s best interests.
- The Probate and Family Court retains equitable authority to order limited postadoption contact when a current, demonstrable showing establishes that such contact is in the child’s best interests.
- Court-ordered postadoption contact is constrained by the adoptive family’s constitutional interests in the care, custody, and control of the child; an order may not unduly burden or interfere with those rights.
- Best-interests findings supporting mandated postadoption contact must rest on present, identifiable benefits to the child, not speculation about future needs or generalized concerns.

## Conclusion

The court recognized limited equitable power to order postadoption contact in § 3 termination proceedings, but held that the petition to dispense with consent could not be denied based on speculative or excessive postadoption visitation requirements where the child’s existing bonds and need for permanency supported adoption by the preadoptive parents.


Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. 550, 728 N.E.2d 292 (Mass. 2000)