## Facts

- An insurer issued an indemnity policy to a physician that covered certain liabilities but excluded liability arising from criminal abortions.
- The insurer filed a federal declaratory judgment action disputing coverage after the physician incurred liability in a state-court damages suit.
- After an earlier appeal in the same dispute, the physician amended to seek indemnity for a state-court consent judgment, plus related costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.
- The insurer denied coverage, asserting the physician’s underlying conduct was a criminal abortion within the policy exclusion.
- At trial, the central factual dispute was whether the physician had engaged in criminal conduct when the underlying liability arose.
- The record included evidence that could have supported a verdict for the insurer, but the physician testified he committed no criminal act.
- The insurer did not move for a directed verdict or otherwise challenge evidentiary sufficiency before the case was submitted to the jury.
- The jury found for the physician, and judgment was entered accordingly.

## Issues

1. Whether the insurer could obtain judgment notwithstanding the verdict after failing to move for a directed verdict, and whether the evidence required judgment as a matter of law.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the insurer’s motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

## Decision

- The court of appeals affirmed.
- Judgment notwithstanding the verdict was unavailable on this record; in any event, the physician’s testimony provided a legally sufficient basis for the jury to find no criminal conduct when evidence was viewed favorably to the verdict.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial, even if the trial judge could have granted one; the circumstances were not exceptional enough to justify appellate interference.

## Legal Principles

- For a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve conflicts in that party’s favor; credibility determinations are for the jury when substantial evidence supports the verdict.
- A judge may not enter judgment as a matter of law merely because the judge disbelieves witnesses or thinks the weight of evidence favors the other side; doing so would displace the jury’s fact-finding role.
- On a motion for a new trial, the trial judge may weigh evidence and assess credibility, and may set aside a verdict supported by substantial evidence if it is against the clear weight of the evidence or rests on false evidence.
- Appellate review of orders granting or denying a new trial is extremely limited; such rulings are discretionary and generally not reviewable absent exceptional circumstances amounting to an abuse of discretion.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit held that the insurer was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the verdict could be supported when the evidence was taken favorably to the insured, and it further held that the denial of a new trial fell within the trial court’s broad discretion, which an appellate court will disturb only in exceptional situations.


Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1941)