Facts
- Two young men agreed to settle a dispute by fighting, resulting in injuries to one or both.
- The case raised the legal issue of whether mutual consent could provide a defence to a criminal charge resulting from such harm.
- The matter was referred to the Court of Appeal for authoritative determination.
Issues
- Can the consent of both parties serve as a defence to actual bodily harm arising from a consensual fight?
- In what circumstances is consent a valid defence to harm under criminal law?
- How should the law balance individual autonomy with the protection of public interests where consensual violence occurs?
Decision
- The Court of Appeal held that consent is not a defence to a charge of actual bodily harm in the context of a consensual fight.
- Recognized exceptions were defined, including organized sports, medical procedures, and lawful punishment of children, where consent is valid due to public interest and legal oversight.
- The Court found that activities threatening public order, such as unregulated consensual fights, remain illegal even if consent is given.
Legal Principles
- Consent generally provides no defence to actual bodily harm except in legally recognized activities with clear public value and statutory regulation.
- The law prioritizes public safety and order over personal consent where the activity involves a risk of harm to society.
- Exceptions to this rule include activities such as contact sports, medical treatment, and lawful discipline, which are structured and regulated.
- The principle from this case has been applied in subsequent case law, such as R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212, confirming that public welfare overrides private agreement in cases of intentional harm.
Conclusion
Attorney-General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715 establishes that consent is not generally a defence to actual bodily harm unless the conduct falls into a limited set of socially sanctioned exceptions, reaffirming the law’s emphasis on public interest in matters of consensual violence.