## Facts

- On April 23, 1990, around 5:00 p.m., Georges Aguehounde was walking north on the east side of Wisconsin Avenue in northwest Washington, D.C., and began crossing Fessenden Street in a marked crosswalk at a signalized intersection.
- Aguehounde testified that three or four steps before reaching the corner he looked left (toward westbound-to-eastbound traffic on Fessenden Street) and did not see an approaching vehicle.
- At the corner, Aguehounde saw a green light facing him; he could not recall whether the pedestrian “walk/don’t walk” signal was displayed.
- Aguehounde acknowledged he did not stop at the curb and did not remember looking left immediately before stepping into the crosswalk.
- Erica Davis was driving eastbound on Fessenden Street. She testified her light turned green when she was about a block from the intersection, and she entered the intersection at about 20 mph while her light was still green.
- Davis testified she first saw Aguehounde at the curb as she entered the crosswalk, and that he then stepped out in front of her vehicle; she braked but struck him. Aguehounde was paralyzed.
- Aguehounde and his wife sued the District of Columbia, alleging negligent traffic-signal timing—specifically, an unsafe “clearance interval,” the time intended to separate conflicting traffic movements so vehicles clear the intersection before cross traffic proceeds.
- Evidence showed the clearance interval at the intersection had been 4.5 seconds and was reduced to 4.0 seconds about a year before the collision; plaintiffs contended a longer interval (about 6.0 seconds) was needed for pedestrian safety.
- A District representative testified that the District did not regularly weigh economic or social considerations when setting clearance intervals.
- A jury found for Aguehounde and awarded damages exceeding \$7 million.
- The trial court granted the District judgment as a matter of law, ruling that (1) the District was immune because signal timing was a discretionary governmental function and (2) Aguehounde was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to look for oncoming traffic before stepping off the curb.
- Aguehounde appealed seeking reinstatement of the jury verdict.

## Issues

1. Whether the District is immune from tort liability because setting a traffic signal’s clearance interval is a discretionary governmental function.
2. Whether Aguehounde’s failure to look toward oncoming traffic immediately before stepping into the crosswalk made him contributorily negligent as a matter of law, barring recovery.

## Decision

- The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment as a matter of law for the District.
- The court held that, on these facts, setting the timing of the traffic light (including the clearance interval) involved discretionary decision-making tied to traffic management and therefore fell within discretionary-function immunity.
- The court also held that Aguehounde was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because he did not look for traffic immediately before entering the roadway, even though he had a green light.
- Because either ground supported judgment for the District, the jury verdict was not reinstated.

## Legal Principles

- The District is not liable in tort for discretionary governmental functions—acts involving judgment and choice connected to governmental policy—rather than purely ministerial execution of a fixed directive.
- Discretionary-function analysis focuses on the nature of the decision; technical work by employees can still be discretionary when it requires balancing safety and traffic flow within the government’s traffic-control program.
- The District bears the burden to show the challenged conduct qualifies as discretionary for immunity purposes.
- In the District of Columbia, contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery.
- A pedestrian with a favorable signal still has a duty of reasonable care; failing to look for oncoming traffic immediately before stepping from the curb into the street can constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law when no reasonable juror could find otherwise.

## Conclusion

The court affirmed judgment for the District because traffic-signal clearance-interval timing was treated as a discretionary traffic-management decision shielded by governmental immunity, and because Aguehounde’s failure to look for approaching traffic just before entering the crosswalk amounted to contributory negligence as a matter of law, independently barring recovery.


Aguehounde v. District of Columbia, 666 A.2d 443 (1995)