## Facts

- Twenty-nine pavement dwellers, including Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, lived in huts built on public footpaths along Rakhial Road in Ahmedabad, a main road about 80 feet wide with footpaths about 10 feet and 8 feet wide on either side.
- The huts were unauthorised encroachments on the footpaths where pedestrians were meant to pass and re-pass safely.
- When the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation attempted to remove the encroachments on December 10, 1982, the pavement dwellers approached the Gujarat High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained an interim stay against removal.
- By final judgment (February 20, 1991), the High Court restrained the Corporation from removing the huts until “suitable accommodation” was provided and also required a hearing consistent with natural justice before removal of unauthorised encroachments.
- The Corporation challenged the High Court’s order before the Supreme Court of India by special leave.
- During the Supreme Court proceedings (order dated September 11, 1995), the Court directed the Corporation to frame and place before it a scheme to provide alternative accommodation so the hut dwellers could shift within a specified period.
- The Corporation placed a rehabilitation scheme before the Court, including alternative housing options at sites such as Narol and Vinzol/Lambha (including site-and-services and EWS housing), with basic amenities and eligibility conditions tied to income and allotment terms.
- The affected persons, through counsel assisting the Court, objected that the offered locations were too far from Rakhial Road and would impair their work carried on at or near the pavement.
- By the time of final hearing, circumstances had changed: only about 10 of the original 29 petitioners were still present, and many original occupants had accepted money and left, after which other persons occupied some huts; the number of persons in occupation had increased beyond the original petitioners.
- Because respondents were not effectively represented, the Supreme Court sought assistance from an amicus curiae and also provided legal aid representation to argue on behalf of the pavement dwellers.

## Issues

1. Whether the High Court was right to bar removal of footpath encroachments until “suitable accommodation” was provided to the encroachers.
2. Whether, and to what extent, principles of natural justice require a pre-removal hearing or notice before clearing unauthorised pavement huts.
3. Whether claims under Articles 14 and 21 (including livelihood and shelter) give pavement encroachers a right to remain on public footpaths, or a right to resettlement as a precondition to eviction.
4. How the Corporation’s statutory duties to keep streets and footpaths clear under municipal law should be applied when confronted with long-standing encroachments.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s broad restraint that prevented removal until alternative accommodation was provided.
- The Court held that no person has a right to encroach on public streets/footpaths and then insist on procedures that would effectively reward or prolong unlawful occupation.
- The Court rejected an inflexible rule requiring a full, individualized pre-decisional hearing in every encroachment case; what fairness requires depends on the situation.
- For recent encroachments, the Court indicated that prompt removal may be carried out without an elaborate natural justice process.
- Where the authorities have allowed encroachments to remain for a long period, fairness requires a reasonable, short prior notice (commonly described in the judgment in the range of about 10 days to two weeks), served personally where possible or by substituted service such as affixing notice on the structure.
- If encroachers do not remove the huts within the notice period, the Corporation may remove the encroachments and may use reasonable force if there is resistance.
- The Court considered the Corporation’s rehabilitation scheme placed before it pursuant to the Court’s earlier direction and treated the scheme as an administrative measure that could be offered, but not as a constitutional condition that must be satisfied before public footpaths can be cleared.
- Given that many original petitioners had left and others had taken their place, the Court did not treat continued occupation by transferees or later occupants as a basis to continue the High Court’s protection.

## Legal Principles

- Procedural fairness is fact-specific; natural justice does not impose a single, rigid requirement of a full hearing before removal of unlawful street encroachments.
- Encroachment on public footpaths and streets creates no legal entitlement to remain; public ways are held for the use of the general public, including pedestrians’ safety and free passage.
- Municipal bodies have statutory duties to maintain streets and footpaths and to remove obstructions and encroachments; courts should not convert tolerance or delay in enforcement into a continuing right in the encroacher.
- Article 21’s protection of life, livelihood, and shelter does not confer a right to occupy public property, and it does not make permanent alternative housing an automatic precondition to eviction from a public footpath.
- A limited notice requirement may be appropriate where an encroachment has existed for a long time with municipal inaction, mainly to give occupants a chance to vacate and remove their belongings voluntarily.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court of India held that pavement dwellers occupying public footpaths have no right to continue encroaching on public streets and cannot demand resettlement as a condition for eviction, while still requiring a reasonable, short notice in cases of long-tolerated encroachments and allowing prompt removal—without a full hearing—for recent unlawful occupations.


Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, (1996) Supp. 7 S.C.R. 548 (India)