## Facts

- A.J., a 16-year-old detained at the Jackson County Juvenile Justice Center (JCJJC), sued on behalf of a certified class of all persons detained at JCJJC since November 15, 1989, alleging unconstitutional detention policies and conditions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.
- The class challenged alleged overcrowding and JCJJC’s practice of requiring some detainees to sleep on floor mattresses as violating Fourteenth Amendment due process.
- A.J. also pursued individual damages claims alleging improper medical care and unlawful placement in isolation.
- During litigation, class counsel sought access to detained class members to investigate conditions; the district court limited counsel’s access by requiring exhaustion of alternative information sources and a showing of “compelling need” before interviews could occur, citing juvenile confidentiality concerns.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the class overcrowding and floor-mattress claims and on A.J.’s medical-care claim; A.J.’s isolation claim proceeded to trial, where the court found for defendants on remaining issues.
- Plaintiffs appealed the adverse merits rulings, the communication restrictions, and aspects of the attorneys’ fees determination under § 1988.

## Issues

1. What constitutional standard governs conditions-of-confinement claims by juvenile pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, and whether it is more protective than the standard applied to adult pretrial detainees.
2. Whether overcrowding and use of floor mattresses at JCJJC violated juvenile detainees’ due process rights.
3. Whether the district court’s restrictions on communications between class counsel and detained class members (exhaustion plus “compelling need”) were permissible in a Rule 23 class action.
4. Whether the district court’s § 1988 attorneys’ fees analysis properly accounted for prevailing-party status and degree of success.

## Decision

- The Eighth Circuit held that, as a general matter, the due process standard for juvenile pretrial detainees should be construed more liberally than the standard for adult detainees.
- The court affirmed summary judgment for defendants on the class claims challenging overcrowding and floor mattresses, concluding the record did not establish unconstitutional conditions.
- The court reversed the district court orders that severely restricted class counsel’s access to and communication with detained class members, finding the restrictions overbroad and insufficiently justified.
- The court affirmed the rulings against A.J. on his individual medical-care and isolation claims.
- The court reversed in part and remanded the attorneys’ fees determination for reconsideration consistent with governing § 1988 standards and Supreme Court guidance on degree of success.

## Legal Principles

- Juvenile pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment due process protections are generally more protective than those applied to adult pretrial detainees.
- Conditions of juvenile detention violate due process when they amount to punishment or are not reasonably related to legitimate governmental objectives; discomfort alone is insufficient absent evidence of serious deprivation or unjustified imposition.
- Restrictions on communications between class counsel and class members in a Rule 23 action must be supported by specific findings, narrowly tailored to a demonstrated need, and cannot rest on generalized or speculative concerns.
- Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, prevailing-party and fee-amount determinations must reflect the degree of success obtained; limited or technical success may warrant a reduced award.

## Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit clarified that juvenile pretrial detainees are entitled to heightened due process protection, upheld defendants’ victories on the challenged conditions and A.J.’s individual claims on the record presented, reversed overbroad limits on class counsel’s access to detained class members, and remanded for reevaluation of attorneys’ fees in light of the results achieved.


A.J. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 1995)