A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)

Facts

  • A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. and its principals operated a wholesale live-poultry business in Brooklyn, New York, buying chickens shipped from out of state and selling slaughtered poultry to local retailers within New York City.
  • The federal government prosecuted them under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA) and the President-approved “Live Poultry Code,” which regulated wages, hours, and trade practices.
  • The indictment (originally 60 counts, later narrowed) charged code violations including selling “unfit” poultry, violating wage-and-hour rules, and breaching trade-practice rules such as the “straight killing” requirement limiting customer selection of individual birds.
  • The defendants argued (1) NIRA § 3 unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the President and (2) the Code impermissibly regulated intrastate transactions beyond Congress’s commerce power; they also raised due process objections.
  • The district court convicted the defendants on conspiracy and multiple substantive counts; the court of appeals largely affirmed, reversing two wage-and-hour counts as beyond federal power.

Issues

  1. Whether NIRA § 3 unconstitutionally delegated legislative power by authorizing the President to approve or prescribe “codes of fair competition” without adequate statutory standards.
  2. Whether applying the Live Poultry Code to the defendants’ in-state slaughter and sales transactions exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the convictions.
  • The Court held NIRA § 3 invalid because it delegated essential legislative power to the President without sufficient standards to guide discretion.
  • The Court also held that, as applied, the Code regulated local transactions after the poultry had come to rest within the state and therefore exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
  • Justice Cardozo (joined by Justice Stone) concurred in the judgment and separately emphasized the excessive breadth of the delegation.
  • Congress may permit executive or administrative bodies to make subordinate rules and to determine facts for applying a declared policy, but Congress must set the governing policy and standards; it cannot transfer the essential legislative function.
  • Statutory direction that the President act to “effectuate the policy” of a broadly stated program, coupled with authority to approve, condition, or create binding industry codes, provides inadequate constraints and violates the nondelegation doctrine.
  • Economic emergency does not expand federal constitutional power.
  • Congress may regulate interstate commerce directly, but regulation of local production, slaughtering, and retail sales that only indirectly affects interstate commerce falls outside the commerce power under the direct/indirect effects framework applied by the Court.
  • Goods shipped in interstate commerce may cease to be in interstate commerce when they reach a permanent resting place and are commingled with in-state property; subsequent local transactions are not necessarily part of a continuing interstate “flow.”

Conclusion

The Court invalidated NIRA § 3 for conferring standardless code-making authority on the President and held that applying the Live Poultry Code to in-state slaughter and sales exceeded Congress’s commerce power because the regulated conduct was local and occurred after interstate shipments had ended.