## Facts

- Phillip Andrew Alday was a longshoreman on the payroll of Atchafalaya Industries, Inc. (Atchafalaya), a company that supplied labor for barge off-loading and related maritime work.
- Patterson Truck Line, Inc. (Patterson) operated a shipyard where barges were unloaded.
- Atchafalaya and Patterson entered a master services agreement under which Atchafalaya provided workers to Patterson.
- The agreement stated that the supplied workers would remain employees of Atchafalaya and disclaimed any employment relationship between Patterson and Atchafalaya’s employees.
- Alday’s first assignment for Atchafalaya was to unload barges at Patterson’s shipyard.
- On Alday’s first day at Patterson’s worksite, he was seriously injured while working on navigable waters.
- Alday filed a maritime personal-injury tort suit against Patterson seeking damages.
- Patterson moved for summary judgment, arguing Alday was Patterson’s borrowed employee and thus limited to compensation benefits as his exclusive remedy under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 905(a).
- The district court granted summary judgment for Patterson, reasoning that Patterson’s foreman directed and supervised Alday’s work and that Alday was therefore Patterson’s borrowed employee.
- Alday appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the summary-judgment record established, as a matter of law, that Alday became Patterson’s borrowed employee under the Fifth Circuit’s multi-factor test.
2. If not, whether disputed facts required reversal of summary judgment applying LHWCA exclusivity to bar Alday’s tort claim against Patterson.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit reversed the summary judgment for Patterson.
- The court held that, although the borrowed-employee doctrine can apply in LHWCA cases, the record presented fact disputes on multiple factors used to decide borrowed-employee status.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant receives LHWCA § 905(a) tort immunity only if it qualifies as the worker’s employer, which can include being a “borrowing” employer under the borrowed-servant doctrine.
- In the Fifth Circuit, borrowed-employee status is evaluated under a nonexclusive, multi-factor framework drawn from Ruiz v. Shell Oil Co. and later cases, including:  
  - who controlled the employee and the work beyond mere suggestions;  
  - whose work was being performed;  
  - whether there was an agreement or understanding between the payroll employer and the alleged borrowing employer;  
  - whether the employee acquiesced in the new work situation;  
  - whether the payroll employer ended its relationship with the employee;  
  - who furnished the tools and the place of performance;  
  - the length of the new work arrangement;  
  - who had the right to discharge the employee; and  
  - who had the obligation to pay the employee.
- No single factor is dispositive, including control; the test requires weighing the full set of circumstances.
- Contract terms disclaiming an employment relationship are not conclusive, but they are evidence relevant to the “agreement/understanding” factor and may conflict with other evidence such as day-to-day supervision.
- When the alleged borrowing relationship is extremely short (here, effectively one day), factors such as employee acquiescence, termination of the payroll employer’s relationship, and the practical meaning of contractual provisions may require fact-finding and are often not suitable for resolution on summary judgment.
- Summary judgment is improper where reasonable factfinders could weigh the Ruiz factors differently based on disputes or competing inferences from the record.

## Conclusion

Because Alday’s one-day assignment, the parties’ contract disclaiming any employment relationship with Patterson, and other Ruiz factors left room for competing factual inferences about whether Alday truly became Patterson’s borrowed employee, the Fifth Circuit held that Patterson was not entitled to LHWCA tort immunity as a matter of law and reversed the summary judgment barring Alday’s tort claim.


Alday v. Patterson Truck Line, Inc., 750 F.2d 375 (1985)