## Facts

- Carlos Alexander worked for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), beginning in 1999, in safety-sensitive mechanic-helper roles.
- Alexander had a long history of alcoholism, dating to approximately 1980.
- In 2007, a supervisor detected alcohol on Alexander’s breath; he tested positive, was suspended, referred to WMATA’s Employee Assistance Program, and returned to work under periodic alcohol testing.
- In 2009, Alexander again tested positive for alcohol at work, violating the employee-assistance conditions; WMATA terminated him.
- At his exit interview, WMATA told Alexander he could apply to be rehired in one year if he completed an intensive alcohol-dependency treatment program.
- Alexander completed an outpatient chemical-dependency program in January 2010 and applied multiple times to be rehired; WMATA declined to hire him for three positions in 2010–2011, including after a contingent offer was withdrawn as a result of screening/physical disqualification.
- Alexander alleged WMATA offered shifting explanations (including safety concerns) but that the refusals were because of his alcoholism history; he asserted he was not drinking at the time of the post-treatment applications.
- Alexander filed an EEOC charge in September 2010 alleging disability discrimination based on his alcoholism history; the EEOC found reasonable cause.
- Alexander sued under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which incorporates the ADA’s (as amended by the ADAAA) definitions of “disability.”

## Issues

1. Whether Alexander presented sufficient evidence of “disability” under § 504 (actual disability, record of disability, or regarded-as disability) to survive summary judgment.
2. Whether the district court failed to apply the ADAAA’s broader standards, particularly for “record of” and “regarded as” disability.
3. Whether Alexander’s claims were untimely based on the timing of his EEOC charge and the challenged hiring decisions.

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for WMATA and remanded.
- The court held the district court improperly confined its analysis to whether Alexander’s alcoholism substantially limited a major life activity and failed to evaluate the “record of” and “regarded as” definitions.
- The court held record evidence could allow a reasonable jury to find Alexander disabled under the ADAAA’s expanded “record of” and “regarded as” prongs, given WMATA’s knowledge of his alcoholism, workplace alcohol tests, treatment history, and expressed safety concerns.
- The court rejected WMATA’s limitations defenses and treated the claims as timely in light of the EEOC charge and subsequent related adverse actions.

## Legal Principles

- Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act incorporates the ADAAA’s three alternative disability definitions: actual disability, record of disability, and regarded-as disability; courts must assess all applicable prongs.
- Under the ADAAA, a plaintiff proceeding under the “regarded as” prong need not prove the perceived impairment substantially limits a major life activity; it is enough to show adverse action because of an actual or perceived impairment (subject to the statute’s limits for impairments that are transitory and minor).
- A documented history of alcoholism and employer actions reflecting concern about that history can support “record of” and “regarded as” disability theories even if current functional limits are disputed.
- On summary judgment, the question is whether a reasonable jury could find disability under any prong and causation based on the record; courts may not resolve factual disputes by weighing evidence.

## Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit held that summary judgment was improper because the evidence, viewed under the ADAAA’s expanded framework, could support findings that WMATA treated Alexander adversely due to a record of alcoholism or because it regarded him as impaired, and it remanded for further proceedings.


Alexander v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 826 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2016)