Facts
- Christopher Alexander alleged he was injured when he slipped and fell on ice and snow at a gas station owned by W.F. Shuck Petroleum Company.
- Shuck had an insurance contract with Utica First Insurance Company that provided liability coverage for injuries at the station and included a medical-payments provision promising to pay reasonable medical expenses for injured persons.
- Alexander sued Shuck for negligence, alleging Shuck failed to keep the premises reasonably safe.
- Alexander also sued Utica for breach of contract, alleging Utica did not pay his medical expenses as promised in the policy’s medical-payments coverage.
- Utica’s involvement in the complaint was based on the insurance contract; Alexander did not allege Utica committed the slip-and-fall tort.
Issues
- May an injured person plead a direct breach-of-contract claim against the tortfeasor’s insurer for medical-payments benefits by alleging intended third-party beneficiary status, without first obtaining a judgment against the insured?
- On a motion to strike, must the court limit its review to the complaint and its attached exhibits, rather than policy language supplied only in briefing?
Decision
- The court denied Utica’s motion to strike the breach-of-contract count against it.
- The court treated the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of the motion to strike and read those allegations in the manner most favorable to legal sufficiency.
- The court declined to decide coverage by relying on policy language or factual material not included in (or attached to) the pleadings.
- The negligence claim against Shuck remained pending; the ruling addressed only whether Alexander’s contract count against Utica could proceed at the pleading stage.
Legal Principles
- A motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged count; the court assumes the truth of well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences drawn from them.
- In ruling on a motion to strike, the court generally may not consider materials outside the pleadings, including documents attached solely to memoranda.
- Although Connecticut generally bars direct actions against a liability insurer before the insured’s liability is reduced to judgment, a plaintiff may still state a contract claim when the plaintiff alleges facts showing intended third-party beneficiary status under a policy provision that promises payment to injured persons.
- An intended third-party beneficiary may enforce a contractual promise made for that beneficiary’s benefit.
- Medical-payments coverage can be pleaded as a direct promise to pay reasonable medical expenses to injured persons, and the plaintiff’s ability to sue on that promise turns on the pleaded beneficiary allegations and the contract terms as properly presented at the pleading stage.
Conclusion
The Connecticut Superior Court held that Alexander’s complaint, which alleged he was within the class of persons the policy’s medical-payments provision was meant to benefit and that Utica failed to pay promised medical expenses, stated a legally sufficient breach-of-contract claim at the motion-to-strike stage, so Utica’s effort to strike the direct contract count was denied.