Facts
- Alison D. and Virginia M. were in a long-term same-sex relationship and lived together.
- The couple jointly decided to have a child; Virginia conceived through artificial insemination.
- The child was born in 1981; Alison helped pay expenses, supported the household, and co-parented the child during early childhood.
- After the couple separated, they initially maintained a regular visitation arrangement, and Alison continued contributing to household expenses.
- Virginia later restricted and then terminated Alison’s contact with the child; Virginia’s fitness as a parent was undisputed.
- Alison petitioned for visitation under New York Domestic Relations Law (DRL) § 70, asserting she functioned as a parent based on joint intent and caregiving.
Issues
- Whether a nonbiological, nonadoptive former partner who helped plan the child’s conception and co-parented has standing under DRL § 70 to seek visitation as a “parent.”
- Whether DRL § 70 permits courts to treat a “de facto” or “psychological” parent as a “parent” for custody/visitation standing, despite the objection of a fit biological parent.
Decision
- The New York Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the petition for lack of standing.
- The court held Alison was not a “parent” within the meaning of DRL § 70 because she was neither a biological nor adoptive parent.
- The court declined to expand “parent” to include de facto or psychological parents, stating such a change was for the legislature.
- The court emphasized that granting standing would interfere with the rights of a concededly fit biological parent to control the child’s associations.
Legal Principles
- Under DRL § 70, standing to seek custody or visitation is limited to a child’s legal parents, defined in traditional terms as biological or adoptive parents.
- A close, parent-like relationship, joint planning for conception, and shared child-rearing responsibilities do not confer parental standing absent biological or adoptive status.
- Courts will not extend statutory parental standing based on functional caregiving where doing so would diminish a fit legal parent’s authority over the child’s upbringing and relationships.
Conclusion
New York’s highest court held that a nonbiological, nonadoptive former partner lacked standing to seek visitation under DRL § 70, leaving any expansion of parental standing to legislative action and protecting the decision-making authority of a fit biological parent.