## Facts

- Gary Eldon Alvord was convicted in Florida state court of three counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.
- Alvord had a documented history of mental illness, including childhood hospitalization and a prior Michigan adjudication of not guilty by reason of insanity with commitment to a state mental-health facility.
- After escaping from the Michigan hospital, Alvord went to Florida and committed the murders leading to the Florida prosecution.
- A public defender was appointed; Alvord initially refused to communicate with counsel, and counsel learned from the prosecutor about Alvord’s prior insanity adjudication.
- Counsel obtained court-ordered psychiatric examinations on competency; after evaluations (including information from Michigan), Alvord was found competent to stand trial.
- According to the dissenting account, counsel did not obtain or review Alvord’s prior medical records, did not pursue independent mental-health evaluations directed to criminal responsibility, did not alert the trial court to the prior insanity adjudication, and did not meaningfully develop an insanity defense despite its potential legal significance.
- Counsel presented an alibi defense that was described as weak and did so largely because Alvord insisted on foregoing an insanity defense.
- After affirmance on direct review and failure of state postconviction efforts, Alvord sought federal habeas relief alleging, among other claims, ineffective assistance for failure to investigate and present an insanity defense.
- The federal district court granted relief as to sentencing only; the court of appeals reversed that sentencing relief and rejected the ineffective-assistance claim related to the guilt phase.
- Alvord sought Supreme Court review focused on ineffective assistance; the Court denied certiorari, with a written dissent from Justice Marshall joined by Justice Brennan.

## Issues

1. Whether the Supreme Court should review a Sixth Amendment claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and pursue an insanity defense despite substantial evidence of prior insanity and serious mental illness, based on deference to the defendant’s preference not to raise that defense.
2. Whether a finding of competence to stand trial relieves counsel of an independent duty to investigate and exercise professional judgment regarding a potentially dispositive mental-state defense.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, leaving the court of appeals’ judgment in place.
- Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from the denial and would have granted certiorari.
- The dissent argued the petition presented a stark question about whether counsel may abandon investigation of the only plausible defense and follow a mentally ill client’s uninformed strategic choice.
- The dissent criticized the view that competence to stand trial automatically justifies treating a defendant’s refusal of an insanity defense as controlling, without ensuring the decision is informed and without counsel’s investigation.

## Legal Principles

- A denial of certiorari is not a decision on the merits and does not express approval or disapproval of the lower court’s reasoning; it leaves the lower court judgment undisturbed.
- Effective assistance of counsel requires the exercise of professional judgment informed by reasonable investigation, including investigation of mental-health defenses when indicated by available information.
- Competence to stand trial and a defendant’s ability to make informed, legally significant strategic decisions are distinct questions; counsel’s duties are not necessarily exhausted by deference to a competent client’s stated preference.
- In capital cases, the adequacy of counsel’s investigation and strategic choices regarding mental-state defenses can be central to Sixth Amendment analysis.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court declined to review Alvord’s capital habeas case, but a dissent argued that the Sixth Amendment may require counsel to investigate and assess an insanity defense grounded in substantial mental-illness history even when a competent defendant initially resists that strategy.


Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956 (1984)