## Facts

- A consortium of oil companies, operating as Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, sought federal rights-of-way and related permits to build the trans-Alaska oil pipeline across federal land.
- Environmental organizations sued the Secretary of the Interior, alleging intended issuance of rights-of-way and permits violated the Mineral Leasing Act and proceeded without compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act.
- The district court initially enjoined permit issuance, later dissolved the injunction, denied permanent relief, and dismissed the complaint.
- The D.C. Circuit reinstated injunctive relief on Mineral Leasing Act grounds.
- While merits litigation was pending, Congress amended the Mineral Leasing Act in 1973 to authorize the pipeline subject to conditions, mooting the underlying dispute over permit legality.
- After mootness, the D.C. Circuit ordered Alyeska to pay one-half of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees, reasoning the plaintiffs acted as “private attorneys general” and conferred a common public benefit.

## Issues

1. Whether a federal court may, under general equitable powers and a “private attorney general” theory, award attorney’s fees against a private losing party absent explicit statutory authorization.
2. Whether the fee award could be sustained under any recognized equitable exception to the rule that each party bears its own attorney’s fees.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the fee award.
- The Court held that, under the American Rule, attorney’s fees are not recoverable in federal litigation absent statutory authorization or a recognized narrow exception.
- The Court rejected a general “private attorney general” doctrine as a judicially created basis for fee shifting.
- The Court concluded respondents’ fee request did not fit within traditional equitable exceptions (e.g., bad faith, common fund, or willful disobedience of a court order).

## Legal Principles

- Under the American Rule, prevailing parties ordinarily may not recover attorney’s fees from the losing party in federal court absent statutory authorization.
- Federal courts’ equitable authority to award fees is limited to established exceptions (including bad faith litigation conduct, common-fund/common-benefit tied to a fund, and sanctions for disobedience of court orders).
- Broad fee-shifting rules that incentivize enforcement of public policies are for Congress to create through legislation, not for courts to impose through general equity.

## Conclusion

The Court reaffirmed that fee shifting in federal litigation is generally unavailable without statutory authorization and refused to recognize a freestanding “private attorney general” exception, holding that any broad reallocation of litigation costs to advance public-policy enforcement is a legislative choice.


Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)