## Facts

- Indianapolis enacted a 2000 ordinance regulating minors’ access to certain coin-operated video games deemed “harmful to minors.”
- As applied in this case, the ordinance targeted games containing “graphic violence,” defined as realistic depictions of serious injury (e.g., dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation, maiming, or disfigurement).
- For locations operating five or more machines, operators could not allow unaccompanied minors to use a covered game; covered machines had to display warning signs and be physically separated by a partition that concealed the viewing area.
- Locations with fewer than five machines were subject to the same requirements except the partition requirement.
- Violations were punishable by monetary penalties and potential suspension or revocation of the right to operate the machines.
- Video game manufacturers and their trade association sued city officials responsible for enforcement, alleging the ordinance violated the First Amendment.
- The district court denied a preliminary injunction; enforcement was stayed pending appeal.

## Issues

1. Whether violent video games are protected expression under the First Amendment.
2. Whether Indianapolis’s ordinance is a content-based restriction on protected speech directed at minors and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
3. Whether the City showed a compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring sufficient to justify restricting minors’ access to games depicting graphic violence.
4. Whether plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction, including likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction and remanded with instructions to enter an injunction barring enforcement of the ordinance.
- The court treated video games as protected expressive works; depictions of violence are not exempt from protection merely because they are violent.
- The ordinance was content-based because it singled out games based on violent content and imposed access limits and physical-segregation requirements.
- The City’s evidentiary showing (psychological and social science materials) did not demonstrate a compelling interest sufficient to justify the restriction; at most it suggested short-term changes in aggressive thoughts or feelings, not proven real-world violence.
- The ordinance was not narrowly tailored and imposed substantial burdens on access and on operators’ facilities (signage, partitioning, and accompaniment conditions) backed by penalties, while sweeping broadly over protected expression.
- Irreparable harm was established because enforced speech restrictions cause irreparable injury and because operators would be compelled to reconfigure premises and risk revenue loss.

## Legal Principles

- Video games, including interactive works depicting violence, are protected speech under the First Amendment.
- Violence is not governed by obscenity doctrine; government cannot extend “harmful to minors” obscenity-style standards from sexual content to violent content as a categorical exception to protection.
- Content-based restrictions on protected speech directed at minors trigger strict scrutiny and require proof of a compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring.
- Under strict scrutiny, speculative or weak evidence of harm is insufficient to justify broad speech restrictions.
- Preliminary injunctions are appropriate where plaintiffs show a strong likelihood of success on a First Amendment claim and irreparable harm from enforcement, with the balance of harms and public interest favoring protection of speech.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit held that Indianapolis’s restrictions on minors’ access to video games depicting graphic violence were a content-based regulation of protected expression that the City failed to justify under strict scrutiny, warranting a preliminary injunction against enforcement.


Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001)