## Facts

- New York amended its “harmful to minors” law in 1996 by adding N.Y. Penal Law § 235.21(3), targeting certain internet communications involving depictions of nudity or sexual conduct deemed “harmful to minors.”
- The law made it a Class E felony to knowingly and intentionally use a computer communication system to initiate or engage in such communication with a minor.
- “Harmful to minors” was defined using a three-part test focusing on prurient appeal to minors, patent offensiveness by adult community standards for minors, and lack of serious value for minors.
- The statute applied to both commercial and noncommercial online speech and included affirmative defenses (e.g., reasonable efforts to verify age, use of adult access codes or credit cards).
- A coalition of libraries, publishers, and online speakers/intermediaries sued state officials responsible for enforcement, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
- Plaintiffs contended that internet speakers cannot reliably determine users’ age or geographic location and would self-censor to avoid potential New York prosecution, restricting adult-accessible speech nationwide.
- Plaintiffs also asserted the law regulated communications occurring partly or wholly outside New York and would burden interstate internet activity.

## Issues

1. Whether N.Y. Penal Law § 235.21(3), applied to internet communications, violates the Dormant Commerce Clause by regulating extraterritorially and unduly burdening interstate commerce.
2. Whether the statute violates the First Amendment because it is overbroad and chills a substantial amount of constitutionally protected adult speech.

## Decision

- The court granted declaratory and injunctive relief and permanently enjoined enforcement of § 235.21(3).
- The court held the statute unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause because it effectively projected New York’s standards onto interstate internet communications and risked inconsistent, state-by-state regulation.
- The court also held the statute unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment because it would deter substantial protected speech by forcing speakers to limit content to what is suitable for minors.
- The court found the statute’s affirmative defenses insufficient to cure the constitutional defects given the practical limits of online age and location verification.
- The state did not appeal.

## Legal Principles

- A state law violates the Dormant Commerce Clause if it directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the state or has the practical effect of regulating extraterritorially.
- State regulation of an inherently interstate communications medium is suspect where it would subject speakers to a patchwork of inconsistent state standards, effectively requiring compliance with the most restrictive rule.
- The internet functions as an instrumentality of interstate commerce for Dormant Commerce Clause analysis when state content rules necessarily affect interstate transmission and access.
- A statute restricting speech is unconstitutionally overbroad if, in operation, it prohibits or chills a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its legitimate scope.
- In assessing overbreadth for online speech restrictions, courts consider whether speakers can feasibly segregate minors from adults; impracticable or burdensome age-verification mechanisms may intensify chilling effects.

## Conclusion

The court invalidated and enjoined New York’s internet “harmful to minors” provision because regulating online communications with state-specific standards would reach beyond state borders and burden interstate commerce, and because the statute’s practical effect was to suppress substantial constitutionally protected adult speech.


Am. Libr. Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)