## Facts

- Illinois charged Richard L. Ambrose in 1998 with four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault involving alleged abuse of two five-year-old children.
- Rather than proceed to a criminal trial, Illinois sought Ambrose’s civil commitment under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA), which permits indefinite commitment upon proof of a qualifying mental disorder and sexual dangerousness.
- In 1999, a jury found Ambrose sexually dangerous, and the state court ordered his civil commitment.
- The SDPA permits a committed person to seek release through a “recovery application” asserting recovery and lack of current sexual dangerousness.
- Ambrose filed a recovery application in 2005; after a 2008 bench hearing, the state court denied release.
- At the recovery hearing, a psychiatrist testified as an expert and referenced alleged prior out-of-state abuse incidents based on third-party reports; the judge admitted the information only as a basis for the expert’s opinion, not for the truth of the allegations.
- The record reflected Ambrose’s continued refusal to acknowledge the conduct underlying the commitment and his refusal to participate in treatment.

## Issues

1. Whether admission, during an SDPA recovery hearing, of out-of-state abuse allegations through an expert’s testimony (as information supporting the expert’s opinion) violated due process by rendering the hearing fundamentally unfair.
2. Whether the claim was procedurally defaulted on federal habeas review and, if so, whether ineffective assistance of appellate counsel established “cause and prejudice” to excuse the default.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Ambrose’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.
- The court held the due process evidentiary claim was procedurally defaulted because it was not fairly presented to the state courts, and Ambrose failed to establish cause and prejudice to excuse the default.
- The court rejected ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as “cause,” finding no showing of deficient performance or resulting prejudice under Strickland.
- Alternatively, the court concluded that admitting the out-of-state allegations for the limited purpose of explaining the expert’s opinion did not deny fundamental fairness, especially in a bench hearing where the judge is presumed to apply evidentiary limits correctly.
- The court found no reasonable probability that excluding the challenged references would have changed the denial of recovery, given Ambrose’s lack of treatment participation and lack of demonstrated recovery.

## Legal Principles

- A federal habeas petitioner must fairly present federal constitutional claims to the state courts; failure to do so generally results in procedural default.
- Procedural default may be excused only upon a showing of cause and prejudice (or a miscarriage of justice); ineffective assistance can constitute cause only if Strickland’s deficient-performance and prejudice requirements are met.
- Federal habeas relief based on state evidentiary rulings is limited; the petitioner must show the ruling rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair under the Due Process Clause.
- An expert may rely on information reasonably used by experts, including hearsay-type material, and admission of such information for the limited purpose of explaining the expert’s opinion does not, by itself, establish a due process violation.
- In a bench proceeding, the risk of unfair prejudice is reduced because judges are presumed to understand and follow limiting purposes for admitted evidence.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of habeas relief, concluding that Ambrose’s due process challenge to the recovery-hearing evidence was procedurally barred and, in any event, the limited-purpose admission of out-of-state allegations through expert testimony did not make the SDPA recovery hearing fundamentally unfair or affect the outcome.


Ambrose v. Roeckeman, 749 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2014)