## Facts

- Three individuals convicted for their roles in the 12 October 2002 Bali bombings were sentenced to death under a statute prescribing execution by firing squad.
- They filed a constitutional review challenging the statute governing the implementation of the death penalty, focusing on the firing-squad method rather than capital punishment generally.
- Petitioners argued firing squads risk non-instantaneous death, multiple gunshot wounds, and severe pain, constituting torture or inhuman/degrading treatment.
- The government defended the statute as long-standing positive law designed to produce a quick death through trained personnel and protocol.
- The court received submissions and expert testimony, including medical and religious-law evidence, concerning pain, mechanics of death, and social acceptance of the method.

## Issues

1. Whether execution by firing squad under the challenged statute violates the constitutional protection against torture or inhuman/degrading treatment.
2. Whether the constitution permits capital punishment and, if so, what limits apply to procedures for carrying it out.
3. Whether the constitution requires the state to adopt an alternative execution method allegedly reducing suffering.

## Decision

- The court denied the petition and upheld the constitutionality of the statute prescribing execution by firing squad.
- It held that, as regulated and intended to cause rapid death, the firing-squad method is not unconstitutional torture or inhuman/degrading treatment.
- The court declined to require the legislature to adopt alternative methods (such as lethal injection), finding no constitutional mandate to select the least painful method.
- The ruling left the death sentences enforceable under the existing statutory procedure.

## Legal Principles

- Constitutional prohibitions on torture and inhuman/degrading treatment are not violated by a method of execution that is structured and administered to cause rapid death rather than to inflict pain.
- A method-of-execution challenge turns on design and implementation: procedures aimed at minimizing suffering and avoiding arbitrary or sadistic features are less likely to be unconstitutional.
- Where the constitution does not expressly forbid capital punishment, the legislature retains broad authority to define criminal sanctions and execution procedures, subject to constitutional limits.
- The availability of potentially less painful alternatives does not, by itself, establish a constitutional violation absent a showing that the chosen method deliberately or needlessly increases suffering.

## Conclusion

The court sustained the statutory firing-squad procedure, concluding that an execution method intended and regulated to produce a quick death does not constitute constitutionally prohibited torture or inhuman/degrading treatment, and that selecting an alternative method is primarily a legislative choice.


Amrozi bin Nurhasyim v. Government of Indonesia, No. 21/PUU-VI/2008 (Indon. Const. Ct. 2008)