## Facts

- In 1970, Jewell Anderson executed a will leaving her home to her son, Frank Anderson.
- In 1973, Jewell signed a deed conveying the home to her granddaughter, Altha Miller, in consideration of Miller’s promise to provide Jewell “care and maintenance” for the rest of Jewell’s life.
- Jewell’s son Charlie Anderson obtained the deed on Miller’s behalf and represented that Miller would provide the promised care and maintenance.
- By the time Miller received and accepted the deed, Miller had decided she could not provide Jewell the promised lifetime care.
- Miller accepted the deed anyway, kept it, and did not tell Jewell she would not be able to perform; Miller also did not return the deed.
- Miller never provided Jewell care and maintenance before Jewell’s death.
- In 1975, Miller conveyed the property by deed to Jewell’s son, William Anderson.
- In 1977, Jewell died. Frank, as devisee under the 1970 will, sued to cancel the 1973 deed to Miller on the ground that it was procured by fraud.
- After a bench trial, the trial court found Miller never intended to provide Jewell care and maintenance and cancelled the deed; William appealed as the subsequent grantee.

## Issues

1. Did the “care and maintenance” language in the 1973 deed create a condition subsequent affecting title, or merely a covenant?
2. Was there legally sufficient evidence that Miller accepted the deed with a present intent not to perform the promised lifetime support, such that the deed could be cancelled for fraud?
3. Did Frank, as devisee under Jewell’s will, have a justiciable interest sufficient to maintain an action to cancel the deed?

## Decision

- The court treated the deed’s support provision as a covenant rather than a condition subsequent, because forfeitures are disfavored and the deed language did not clearly create a condition that would automatically defeat title.
- Even though the support obligation was a covenant, the court held that equity may cancel a deed when the promise of support was fraudulently made—i.e., made and accepted with no intent to perform at the time of execution and delivery.
- The evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Miller had determined she could not perform before she accepted the deed, accepted it anyway, and remained silent rather than disclose her inability or return the deed; those circumstances supported an inference of fraudulent intent at the time she took the conveyance.
- Frank had standing because, if the deed were set aside, the property would pass to him under Jewell’s probated will, giving him a direct and present justiciable interest in the controversy.
- The judgment cancelling the deed was affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- Deed language is construed against forfeiture; conditions subsequent are not favored and will not be found unless the instrument clearly shows an intent to create them.
- A promise by the grantee to support the grantor for life, stated as consideration in a deed, is commonly treated as a covenant rather than a condition subsequent.
- A deed may be cancelled in equity when it was procured by fraud, including when a grantee accepts a conveyance based on a promise of support that the grantee had no intention of performing at the time the deed was taken.
- Nonperformance alone does not automatically prove fraud; fraud may be shown through circumstantial evidence of present intent not to perform at the time of the transaction.
- Silence can amount to fraud where the circumstances create a duty to speak, including when a grantee accepts benefits while knowing the grantor is relying on a material assumption the grantee will not fulfill.
- A devisee under a probated will has a justiciable interest to sue to remove an allegedly fraudulent conveyance that blocks the devise.

## Conclusion

Anderson v. Anderson upheld equitable cancellation of a deed conveying a home in exchange for lifetime care where the grantee accepted the conveyance despite knowing she would not provide the promised support and said nothing to the grantor, and it also confirmed that a devisee under the grantor’s will may sue to set aside such a deed because the devisee’s interest depends on whether the conveyance stands.


Anderson v. Anderson, 620 S.W.2d 815 (1981)