## Facts

- Ingrid Anderson’s minor daughter, C.A., had multiple disabilities affecting balance and mobility, limiting independent walking, play, and exercise.
- On medical advice, Anderson used a miniature horse to assist C.A. with therapy and mobility in the family’s uneven backyard and later kept a miniature horse, Elle, at a new residence as a service animal.
- Neighbors complained about odor, sanitation, and property conditions; City officials sought removal of the horse.
- In January 2013, the City enacted an ordinance barring “farm animals,” including horses, on residential property.
- After enforcement began, Anderson was cited and prosecuted for violating the ordinance; she asserted the ADA and FHAA required the City to allow the horse as a disability-related accommodation.
- A municipal court convicted Anderson of violating the ordinance.
- Anderson and a fair-housing organization sued in federal court under ADA Title II and the FHAA, alleging failure to provide a reasonable modification/accommodation, intentional discrimination, and (under the FHAA) disparate impact.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the City on preclusion grounds based on the municipal conviction.

## Issues

1. Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion arising from a municipal-court criminal conviction barred subsequent federal ADA Title II and FHAA civil claims.
2. Whether summary judgment was proper on the ADA Title II “reasonable modification” claim seeking permission to keep a miniature horse as a service animal.
3. Whether summary judgment was proper on the FHAA “reasonable accommodation” claim seeking permission to keep the miniature horse at the dwelling.
4. Whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination under the ADA and FHAA.
5. Whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence that the ordinance caused a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities under the FHAA.

## Decision

- Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
- Held the municipal conviction had no preclusive effect on the federal ADA/FHAA suit because the municipal criminal proceeding’s fact-finding procedures differed substantially from those in a federal civil action.
- Reversed summary judgment on the ADA Title II reasonable-modification claim and the FHAA reasonable-accommodation claim due to genuine disputes of material fact about necessity and reasonableness of allowing the miniature horse.
- Affirmed summary judgment for the City on intentional-discrimination claims under the ADA and FHAA for lack of evidence of discriminatory motive.
- Affirmed summary judgment on the FHAA disparate-impact claim for lack of evidence of a disability-based disproportionate burden.

## Legal Principles

- Preclusion from a prior judgment requires, among other elements, a prior proceeding with sufficiently comparable procedural opportunities; materially different procedures can defeat preclusive effect.
- ADA Title II requires public entities to make reasonable modifications to policies when necessary to avoid disability discrimination, unless the modification would fundamentally alter the relevant program or impose an undue burden; application is fact-specific.
- The FHAA requires reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services when necessary to afford a person with a disability an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling; necessity and reasonableness commonly present fact questions.
- Intentional discrimination under the ADA and FHAA requires evidence of discriminatory intent or motive; enforcement of a facially neutral ordinance, without such evidence, is insufficient.
- FHAA disparate-impact liability requires evidence that a facially neutral policy causes a disproportionate adverse effect on persons with disabilities as a group.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit allowed litigation to proceed on whether permitting a miniature horse at a residence was a reasonable modification/accommodation under the ADA and FHAA, but rejected claims of intentional discrimination and disparate impact, and held that the prior municipal conviction did not bar the federal civil rights claims.


Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2015)