## Facts

- Jonita Anderson, a Georgia resident, sought relief under Georgia’s Family Violence Act against Raymond Deas, a nonresident.
- Anderson alleged Deas made harassing and threatening telephone calls into Georgia from another state, constituting terroristic threats and stalking.
- Anderson filed her petition in the Superior Court of DeKalb County.
- The trial court refused to proceed, concluding it lacked personal jurisdiction over Deas.
- The Court of Appeals initially agreed; the Supreme Court of Georgia remanded for reconsideration in light of a decision interpreting the long-arm statute.
- On remand, the Court of Appeals reconsidered but reached the same jurisdictional result.

## Issues

1. Whether Georgia courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident based on alleged threatening and harassing telephone calls placed from outside Georgia to a person in Georgia.
2. Whether the alleged conduct satisfied Georgia’s long-arm statute under OCGA § 9-10-91(2) (tortious act within Georgia) or OCGA § 9-10-91(3) (tortious injury in Georgia from an out-of-state act plus specified additional contacts).
3. Whether the Family Violence Act’s jurisdiction provision, OCGA § 19-13-2(b), supplied jurisdiction independent of the long-arm statute.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals held Georgia courts lacked personal jurisdiction over Deas and adhered to its prior conclusion on remand.
- Jurisdiction was not available under OCGA § 9-10-91(3) because, even assuming a tortious injury in Georgia, Deas did not meet the statute’s additional-contact requirements (regular business, persistent conduct, or substantial revenue in Georgia).
- Jurisdiction was not available under OCGA § 9-10-91(2) because the alleged tortious act (placing the calls) occurred outside Georgia; in that circumstance, paragraph (3), not paragraph (2), governs.
- Because OCGA § 19-13-2(b) incorporates the long-arm statute’s limits, the Family Violence Act did not extend jurisdiction where the long-arm requirements were unmet.

## Legal Principles

- When an out-of-state act allegedly causes injury in Georgia, personal jurisdiction is analyzed under OCGA § 9-10-91(3), not OCGA § 9-10-91(2).
- OCGA § 9-10-91(3) requires not only an in-state injury from an out-of-state act, but also one of the statute’s added contacts with Georgia (regular business solicitation, a persistent course of conduct, or substantial revenue from Georgia).
- Telephone communications directed into Georgia from another state, without the paragraph (3) contacts, do not establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.
- OCGA § 19-13-2(b) does not create independent jurisdiction; it depends on satisfying OCGA § 9-10-91(2) or (3).

## Conclusion

The court affirmed dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction because the alleged threatening calls were acts committed outside Georgia and the nonresident defendant lacked the additional Georgia contacts required for long-arm jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-10-91(3), which the Family Violence Act does not expand.


Anderson v. Deas, 279 Ga. App. 892, 632 S.E.2d 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)