## Facts

- Linda and Derriel Anderson stayed at a motel near St. Louis owned and operated by James E. Malloy, Peter Zes, and Edward J. Gibson.
- On February 7, 1979, an unknown assailant forcibly entered the room while Linda Anderson was alone and raped her.
- The Andersons sued in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, alleging negligent failure to provide reasonably safe lodging, breach of an express warranty of safety, and fraudulent misrepresentation about security.
- Defendants denied liability, asserted they took all reasonably necessary security steps, and argued Linda Anderson’s conduct in opening the door to a stranger was the proximate cause of her injuries.
- The district court excluded four categories of plaintiffs’ evidence: (1) testimony from a prior rape victim assaulted at the same motel five months earlier, (2) evidence that a neighboring apartment complex was crime-ridden, (3) evidence of security measures used by other local motels/hotels, and (4) evidence that after the rape defendants installed door safety chains and peepholes.
- The district court excluded the post-incident security installations under Federal Rule of Evidence 407.
- The jury returned a defense verdict, and judgment was entered for defendants.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding each of the four categories of evidence offered by plaintiffs.
2. Whether evidence of post-incident installation of door chains and peepholes was admissible under an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 407 because defendants controverted feasibility and utility of such measures.
3. Whether any erroneous exclusion affected substantial rights and required a new trial.

## Decision

- The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
- The court affirmed the exclusions of: (1) the prior rape victim’s testimony, (2) evidence about crime at the neighboring apartment complex, and (3) evidence of security practices at other motels/hotels.
- The court held the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of subsequent installation of door chains and peepholes because defendants controverted feasibility and effectiveness, bringing the evidence within Rule 407’s feasibility exception.
- The court found the Rule 407 error prejudicial because it bore directly on defendants’ central theory that additional devices were unnecessary or ineffective.

## Legal Principles

- Federal Rule of Evidence 407 generally bars evidence of subsequent remedial measures when offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct.
- Subsequent remedial measures evidence may be admitted for another purpose, including proving feasibility of precautionary measures, when feasibility is controverted.
- A defendant may controvert feasibility by affirmatively asserting that specific precautions would not have improved safety or were not useful or practical in the circumstances.
- Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and reversal requires prejudicial error affecting the fairness of the trial.
- Under Rule 403, trial courts may exclude evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by risks of unfair prejudice, confusion, or undue consumption of time.

## Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit ordered a new trial because defendants’ testimony and arguments put the feasibility and value of door chains and peepholes in dispute, making evidence of their later installation admissible under Rule 407; excluding that evidence was a prejudicial abuse of discretion, though the court upheld the other challenged exclusions.


Anderson v. Malloy, 700 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1983)