## Facts

- Carl Anderson worked as an electrician at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard for about 35 years.
- He alleged occupational exposure to asbestos fibers released during shipboard insulation work involving asbestos-containing products manufactured by Owens-Corning.
- Anderson claimed the exposure caused asbestosis and other lung disease.
- He sued under strict products liability, including a failure-to-warn theory.
- Owens-Corning asserted a state-of-the-art position that the relevant asbestos risks were not known or scientifically knowable when the products were manufactured or distributed.
- The trial court excluded state-of-the-art evidence; it then struck Anderson’s failure-to-warn theory on the view that exclusion eliminated Owens-Corning’s principal defense to that claim.
- A jury returned a verdict for Owens-Corning; the trial court granted Anderson a new trial based on the improper removal of the failure-to-warn theory.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the new-trial order, reasoning that state-of-the-art evidence is inadmissible in strict liability asbestos cases.
- The state supreme court reviewed to resolve conflict over admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence in strict liability failure-to-warn actions.

## Issues

1. In a strict products liability failure-to-warn claim, is the manufacturer’s knowledge or scientific knowability of the risk a required component of liability?
2. If knowability is required, is state-of-the-art evidence (that the risk was neither known nor knowable when distributed) relevant and admissible?

## Decision

- The court held that knowledge or knowability of the risk is a component of strict liability based on failure to warn.
- The court held that state-of-the-art evidence is relevant to that component and, subject to ordinary evidentiary rules, is admissible.
- The court affirmed the judgment granting Anderson a new trial because the trial court erred by striking the failure-to-warn theory.
- The court disapproved the categorical view that state-of-the-art evidence is inadmissible in strict liability failure-to-warn cases, and indicated such evidence may be offered on retrial.

## Legal Principles

- Strict liability for failure to warn requires that the risk be known or scientifically knowable at the time of manufacture and/or distribution.
- A manufacturer cannot be liable for failing to warn of risks that were scientifically unknowable at the relevant time; otherwise liability approaches absolute liability, which is not recognized.
- Allowing an objective “should have known” inquiry based on available scientific knowledge does not convert strict liability into negligence; the inquiry is not whether the defendant acted reasonably in researching, but whether the risk was knowable.
- State-of-the-art evidence is admissible to show whether the alleged risk was known or knowable when the product was distributed.

## Conclusion

The court confirmed that strict liability failure-to-warn claims include an objective knowability component and that state-of-the-art evidence addressing whether a risk was known or knowable at distribution is admissible, while affirming a new trial because the failure-to-warn theory was improperly removed.


Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991)