## Facts

- Residents and estates sued W.R. Grace & Co. and Beatrice Foods Co. alleging disposal of industrial solvents, including trichloroethylene (TCE) and tetrachloroethylene (PCE), contaminated groundwater in Woburn, Massachusetts.
- Plaintiffs alleged contaminants migrated into an aquifer supplying municipal Wells G and H, which provided water until the wells closed in 1979.
- Five estates of minors who died of leukemia asserted wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering claims; three living plaintiffs had leukemia in remission or under treatment.
- Numerous non-leukemic plaintiffs alleged exposure caused bodily-system injuries, assorted illnesses, emotional distress, and an increased risk of future disease.
- Six families living over the alleged contamination area asserted nuisance and sought injunctive relief.
- Defendants moved for partial summary judgment targeting: (1) certain wrongful death claims as time-barred, (2) emotional distress claims by non-leukemic plaintiffs, (3) increased-risk-of-future-illness claims, and (4) nuisance-based injunctive relief.

## Issues

1. Whether certain wrongful death claims were barred by the Massachusetts wrongful death statute of limitations, and whether the discovery rule could toll accrual based on delayed knowledge of causation.
2. Whether non-leukemic plaintiffs could recover for emotional distress when defendants claimed there was no compensable physical injury (or only asymptomatic, subclinical injury).
3. Whether “increased risk” of future illness is independently actionable, or recoverable only as future damages tied to a present injury.
4. Whether plaintiffs had standing and an appropriate basis to obtain injunctive relief under a nuisance theory in a private tort action.

## Decision

- The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.
- On wrongful death limitations, the court allowed some claims to proceed where accrual under the discovery rule involved disputed facts, but entered summary judgment against at least one decedent’s claim as time-barred.
- On emotional distress, the court denied summary judgment to the extent distress was alleged to flow from plaintiffs’ own physical harm from exposure, but dismissed claims based solely on distress from witnessing a relative’s illness or death without independent physical injury to the claimant.
- On increased risk, the court declined to recognize a stand-alone claim based only on probabilistic future harm without present injury, while permitting future-disease consequences to be sought as damages if connected to a proven current physical injury.
- On nuisance, the court permitted nuisance-based claims for damages to proceed, but granted summary judgment against requests for injunctive relief.

## Legal Principles

- In latent-injury toxic-tort cases, accrual may be governed by a discovery rule: a claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and its likely cause; application may be fact-specific and unsuitable for summary judgment in some cases.
- Under Massachusetts law, emotional distress damages generally require a sufficient physical component; whether exposure has caused actionable bodily harm, including subclinical harm, can present a factual question for trial.
- Emotional distress based solely on bystander experience of a relative’s suffering or death, without the plaintiff’s own physical injury, is not recoverable under the governing Massachusetts standards applied by the court.
- “Increased risk” of future illness is not a free-standing cause of action absent present injury; future consequences may be compensable as damages when they are reasonably expected to result from an established current injury.
- Private nuisance theories may support damages for contamination-related personal injury, but injunctive relief may be denied where plaintiffs lack standing for broad remedial orders or where the requested injunction exceeds the scope of private tort redress.

## Conclusion

The court limited the toxic-tort case to claims grounded in timely filed causes of action and present, provable injury: it allowed discovery-rule-dependent wrongful death claims and exposure-linked personal-injury and emotional-distress theories to proceed, rejected stand-alone increased-risk and bystander-only distress claims, and barred nuisance-based injunctive relief while permitting nuisance damages claims.


Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986)