## Facts

- Tiffany Ann Rusher was incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) from 2013 to 2016.
- Before incarceration, Rusher allegedly had not been diagnosed with a mental illness.
- After a disciplinary incident, Rusher was placed in solitary confinement, and her mental health allegedly deteriorated.
- Rusher repeatedly attempted self-harm, and the complaint alleged that she was returned to solitary confinement as punishment after each attempt.
- About a year into her confinement, prison medical staff allegedly diagnosed Rusher with multiple mental disorders and noted she remained at risk of harming herself.
- Treatment notes allegedly indicated Rusher needed time outside her cell for activities such as socializing and writing.
- The complaint alleged that, unlike prisoners with serious physical conditions who were transferred out of the facility for advanced care, Rusher was kept and monitored in-house rather than sent for inpatient psychiatric treatment.
- As her condition worsened, Rusher was placed in a crisis cell where she was allegedly kept medicated in isolation, had personal property confiscated, and was monitored under 24-hour guard observation.
- Rusher participated in group therapy at times, but the complaint alleged that after self-harm attempts the prison cancelled her therapy sessions as punishment.
- Kelli Andrews, as administrator of Rusher’s estate, sued the State of Illinois, IDOC, Governor Bruce Rauner, and other defendants, alleging (among other claims) violations of Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act based on disability discrimination and failure to provide reasonable accommodations.
- Andrews alleged that by denying inpatient psychological treatment and placing Rusher in isolation, defendants denied Rusher access to prison services and activities such as education, recreation, exercise, human interaction, and mental-health treatment.

## Issues

1. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged ADA Title II and Rehabilitation Act claims based on disability-based exclusion from or denial of prison services, programs, or activities, rather than only deficient medical treatment.
2. Whether allegations that Rusher was kept in isolation and had therapy cancelled as punishment plausibly alleged a failure-to-accommodate theory under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.

## Decision

- The court denied the moving defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Counts II (ADA) and III (Rehabilitation Act).
- Taking the allegations as true at the pleading stage, the court found the complaint plausibly alleged that Rusher’s mental disability led to her being denied meaningful access to prison services, programs, or activities.
- The court rejected the argument that the claims were merely complaints about the quality of medical care and outside the ADA/RA, concluding the allegations supported discrimination and reasonable-accommodation theories.

## Legal Principles

- On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts well-pleaded facts as true and asks whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief under Twombly/Iqbal.
- Title II of the ADA applies to public entities, including state correctional systems, and prohibits excluding a qualified person with a disability from participation in, or denying the benefits of, services, programs, or activities by reason of disability.
- Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act similarly prohibits disability-based exclusion or denial by recipients of federal financial assistance; its substantive standards generally track Title II in this context.
- A plaintiff can plead ADA/RA liability by alleging disability-based exclusion from prison offerings or failure to make reasonable modifications, even where the factual setting involves medical or mental-health needs.
- ADA/RA claims are not limited to physical access barriers; denial of access to education, recreation, exercise, and mental-health programming can qualify as denial of “services, programs, or activities” in the prison setting.
- At the pleading stage, allegations that officials responded to disability-related behavior (such as self-harm linked to mental illness) with punitive isolation and cancelled therapy can support an inference of disability-based exclusion and failure to provide reasonable accommodation.

## Conclusion

The court allowed the estate’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims to proceed because the complaint plausibly alleged that IDOC and the State responded to Rusher’s serious mental disorders with punitive isolation and cancellation of therapy, which could constitute disability-based denial of access to prison programs and services and a failure to provide reasonable accommodations, rather than only a dispute over inadequate treatment.


Andrews v. Rauner, 2018 WL 3748401 (2018)