## Facts

- Anheuser-Busch owned federally registered trademarks and trade dress associated with its Michelob beer products, including “Michelob,” “Michelob Dry,” distinctive label/can designs, and the “A & Eagle” logo.
- Balducci Publications published *Snicker*, a humor/satire magazine.
- Following public attention to an oil spill in a Missouri river associated with Anheuser-Busch’s water source (without product contamination), *Snicker* printed a full-page mock advertisement resembling Anheuser-Busch’s Michelob advertising.
- The mock ad promoted a fictitious product, “Michelob Oily,” used actual or near-identical Michelob imagery, mimicked the layout and typography of Michelob ads, and altered the slogan to “ONE TASTE AND YOU’LL DRINK IT OILY.”
- The ad included a small, inconspicuous disclaimer indicating an editorial/parody context.
- Anheuser-Busch sued under the Lanham Act and Missouri trademark, unfair-competition, and dilution law, primarily seeking injunctive relief and nominal damages.
- After trial, the district court denied relief, finding no likelihood of confusion and concluding First Amendment interests in parody outweighed any confusion concerns.
- Anheuser-Busch appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the mock “Michelob Oily” advertisement created a likelihood of confusion about Anheuser-Busch’s sponsorship, approval, or affiliation under the Lanham Act.
2. Whether the First Amendment barred liability for trademark infringement and related claims where the challenged use was assertedly satirical.
3. Whether Missouri dilution and related state-law claims could proceed based on the association of famous marks with oil contamination imagery.

## Decision

- The Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment for defendants.
- The court held the district court erred by effectively folding First Amendment considerations into the likelihood-of-confusion inquiry and requiring an unduly demanding showing of confusion.
- Applying the circuit’s multi-factor likelihood-of-confusion test, the court found the parody ad likely confused consumers as to sponsorship or approval.
- Survey evidence showing that a substantial portion of viewers believed Anheuser-Busch created, authorized, or approved the ad was treated as significant evidence of actual confusion.
- The court held the First Amendment did not excuse a confusing use of trademarks where the expressive message could be conveyed without copying so closely and without relying on a minimal disclaimer.
- The court directed entry of relief consistent with its holdings, including injunctive protection for Anheuser-Busch’s marks.

## Legal Principles

- Trademark infringement turns on likelihood of confusion, including confusion as to sponsorship, approval, or affiliation, assessed under the circuit’s multi-factor test (strength, similarity, proximity, intent, actual confusion, and consumer care).
- Evidence of actual confusion (including reliable survey results) is highly probative in the likelihood-of-confusion analysis.
- Parody and other expressive uses are not categorically exempt from the Lanham Act; First Amendment concerns do not authorize confusing use of another’s marks.
- Courts should apply ordinary likelihood-of-confusion analysis rather than raising the plaintiff’s burden because the defendant claims parody.
- A disclaimer that is inconspicuous may be insufficient to dispel confusion when the overall presentation is crafted to resemble a genuine advertisement.
- Under Missouri dilution principles, a famous mark may be protected against uses that tarnish or blur its associations, including through pollution/contamination imagery, particularly when the use is not structured to avoid confusion.

## Conclusion

The Eighth Circuit held that a highly realistic satirical advertisement copying a famous brand’s marks and trade dress can violate trademark and dilution law when it likely confuses consumers about sponsorship or approval, and that First Amendment protection for parody does not extend to confusing, unnecessary imitation.


Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994)