## Facts

- A temporary staffing agency supplied Susan Antheunisse to Tiffany for holiday-season work.
- Tiffany screened and accepted temporary workers for specific departmental assignments; the agency’s role was largely limited to payroll processing.
- Antheunisse worked in Tiffany’s packing department packing china and crystal from October 29, 1984, to December 21, 1984.
- Tiffany supervised the day-to-day work, trained the temporary workers, and retained the power to supervise, discharge, recall, and enforce workplace policies during the assignment.
- On November 28, 1984, Antheunisse injured her knee while working at Tiffany after allegedly slipping on a foreign object.
- Tiffany paid the agency an hourly rate for Antheunisse’s services; the agency paid Antheunisse a lower hourly wage and handled payroll deductions.
- Antheunisse filed a workers’ compensation claim against the staffing agency and also filed a tort action against Tiffany for personal injuries.

## Issues

1. Whether Tiffany was Antheunisse’s “special employer,” making workers’ compensation her exclusive remedy and barring her negligence action against Tiffany.
2. Whether summary judgment was proper on the special-employment question.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment for Tiffany.
- Tiffany qualified as Antheunisse’s special employer under the multi-factor special-employment test.
- Because a special-employment relationship existed, the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision barred Antheunisse’s common-law tort claim against Tiffany.
- The court found no genuine dispute of material fact on special employment, entitling Tiffany to judgment as a matter of law.

## Legal Principles

- An employee of a general employer (including a staffing agency) may simultaneously be the special employee of a borrowing employer; when special employment exists, the borrowing employer receives workers’ compensation immunity.
- Special employment is evaluated using factors including: (1) an express or implied contract of hire with the special employer, (2) whether the work is essentially the special employer’s work, (3) the special employer’s right to control the details of the work, and (4) payment arrangements and related economic realities.
- Consent to special employment may be implied when a worker accepts a specific assignment and works under the borrowing employer’s direction, particularly where the worker could decline the assignment.
- Payroll processing by the staffing agency does not preclude special-employer status when the borrowing employer controls the work and receives the direct benefit of the labor.

## Conclusion

The court held that Tiffany was the plaintiff’s special employer because she accepted the assignment, performed Tiffany’s work, and was subject to Tiffany’s supervision and control, so workers’ compensation provided her exclusive remedy and her negligence suit was dismissed.


Antheunisse v. Tiffany & Co., Inc., 229 N.J. Super. 399, 551 A.2d 1006 (App. Div. 1988)