## Facts

- Ken Neumann loaned Vincent and Mary Ann Antonelli $100,000 in connection with the Antonellis’ condominium project.
- On March 3, 1981, the parties executed two related agreements: (1) an agreement for Neumann to deposit $100,000 into the trust account of the Antonellis’ attorney pending execution of the loan notes, and (2) a separate agreement under which Neumann would provide “landscape consulting” services for the project.
- The Antonellis executed two promissory notes, each for $50,000, bearing interest at 18% per annum, the statutory maximum rate at the time.
- In addition to making the 18% interest payments, the Antonellis made periodic payments equal to 2% of the loan amount; each of those checks was labeled “landscape consultant fee.”
- The Antonellis later stopped making the required payments.
- Neumann sued to recover the amounts due on the promissory notes.
- The Antonellis raised usury as an affirmative defense, asserting the 2% “consulting fee” was actually additional interest that, when combined with the 18% stated rate, exceeded the legal limit.
- After a non-jury trial, the trial court found the Antonellis did not prove usury by clear and convincing evidence and entered judgment for Neumann.
- The Antonellis appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the record contained substantial, competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the Antonellis failed to prove usury by clear and convincing evidence.
2. Whether the additional 2% “landscape consulting fee,” when treated as compensation for the use of the loaned money, constituted interest that rendered the loan usurious and established the required corrupt intent.

## Decision

- The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the final judgment entered for Neumann.
- The court concluded that the 2% “consulting fee,” calculated as a percentage of the loan amount and paid along with interest, operated as additional interest.
- Because the notes already carried the maximum lawful rate (18%), the added 2% charge pushed the effective rate above the statutory ceiling, satisfying the “excess interest” element of usury.
- The court further determined that the circumstances established corrupt intent to take more than the legal rate for the use of the money.
- The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the ruling that the transaction was usurious.

## Legal Principles

- A usurious transaction requires: (1) a loan (express or implied); (2) an understanding that the money must be repaid; (3) an agreement for interest in excess of the legal rate; and (4) a corrupt intent to take more than the legal rate for the use of the money.
- Courts treat charges that are, in reality, compensation for the use of money as interest, even if the parties label those charges as fees under a separate agreement.
- When a lender charges the statutory maximum stated interest rate and also requires a percentage-of-principal payment in connection with the loan, the additional percentage-based payment may be treated as interest for usury purposes.
- Corrupt intent may be inferred from the lender’s knowing receipt of payments that produce an effective rate above the lawful limit; direct proof of a subjective purpose to violate the law is not required when the deal’s structure shows an intent to exact unlawful interest.
- In reviewing a non-jury judgment, an appellate court does not reweigh evidence, but it may reverse if the judgment is not supported by substantial, competent evidence, including where the material facts are essentially undisputed and the legal result is compelled.

## Conclusion

Antonelli held that where a lender charged the statutory maximum 18% interest on promissory notes and also received an additional 2% payment labeled a “landscape consultant fee” that was calculated from the loan principal and paid in tandem with interest, the extra charge functioned as interest, made the transaction usurious, and supported a finding of corrupt intent; therefore, the appellate court reversed the judgment for the lender.


Antonelli v. Neumann, 537 So. 2d 1027 (1988)