AP European History

## Learning Outcomes

- Explain why Britain and France followed appeasement in the 1930s
- Identify how failures of collective security weakened resistance to fascist aggression
- Recall key events and dates including the Rhineland, Anschluss, Munich Agreement, and Nazi-Soviet Pact
- Analyse how distrust between Western democracies and the USSR helped Hitler
- Evaluate whether appeasement caused fascist expansion or mainly failed to stop it
- Use specific evidence in causation, SAQ, DBQ, and LEQ answers

## AP European History Syllabus

For the AP European History, you are expected to understand how appeasement, weak collective security, and mistrust among powers enabled fascist expansion, with a focus on the following syllabus points:

- Know what **appeasement** meant in the 1930s and why Britain and France adopted it
- Identify the importance of the **League of Nations** and why **collective security** failed
- Understand the significance of the **Abyssinian Crisis** of **1935–1936**
- Know that Germany remilitarized the **Rhineland** on **7 March 1936**
- Identify the meaning and importance of **Anschluss** in **March 1938**
- Explain the **Munich Agreement** of **29–30 September 1938** and the Sudetenland crisis
- Understand why Germany’s occupation of the rest of **Czechoslovakia** in **March 1939** damaged appeasement
- Know why distrust between the USSR and Western democracies contributed to the **Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact** of **23 August 1939**

## Test Your Knowledge

_Attempt these questions before reading this article. If you find some difficult or cannot remember the answers, look more closely at that area during your revision._

1. Why did Britain and France choose appeasement instead of immediate confrontation with Hitler?
2. Why was the remilitarization of the Rhineland a major turning point?
3. How was the Munich Agreement different from collective security?
4. Why did Stalin agree to the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939?
5. Was appeasement simply weakness, or did leaders think it served a practical purpose?

## Introduction

In AP European History Unit 8, one major argument is that fascist expansion in the 1930s was not just the result of Hitler’s aggression. It was also made easier by the choices of other states. Britain and France feared another war, doubted one another, distrusted the Soviet Union, and repeatedly failed to enforce the post-1919 settlement. That combination weakened deterrence.

This topic matters because AP questions rarely ask you to list events in isolation. They usually ask you to explain **causation**: why fascist states expanded, why democracy looked weak, and why war became more likely by **1939**. To answer well, you need a chain: League weakness -> failed collective security -> appeasement -> rising distrust -> fascist confidence -> war.

> **Key Term: appeasement**
> A policy of making concessions to aggressive states, especially Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, in the hope of avoiding war.

### Why appeasement seemed reasonable to many leaders

Appeasement is often remembered as a clear mistake, but on the exam you need to explain why it appealed to policymakers at the time. If you only say Chamberlain was weak or naive, your analysis stays shallow.

First, the memory of **World War I** was still raw. British and French leaders had lived through trench warfare, mass death, and economic ruin. Large sections of the public were strongly antiwar. Politicians knew that another general European war might destroy their societies again. That meant compromise could seem morally responsible, not cowardly.

Second, many believed the **Treaty of Versailles** had been too harsh on Germany. Some of Hitler’s early demands looked, at least on the surface, like revision rather than outright conquest. For example, bringing Germans together in one state could be presented as **self-determination**, an idea with respectable roots in post-1918 peace talk. This is why some British observers treated the Anschluss or Sudeten claims differently from later conquests.

Third, Britain and France were not fully ready for war. The **Great Depression** had damaged state finances and increased pressure to focus on unemployment and recovery at home. Rearmament was expensive. Some historians argue appeasement partly bought Britain time to strengthen its air force and defenses. That does not make the policy successful, but it does explain why some leaders defended it.

Fourth, anti-communism mattered. Some conservatives saw Hitler as a barrier against Soviet communism. That did not mean they trusted him, but it affected priorities. If Bolshevism looked like the greater long-term threat, a strong Germany could appear useful.

> **Key Term: collective security**
> The principle that states should act together against aggression, rather than leaving each country to defend itself alone.
>
> **Test Tip:** In an LEQ or DBQ, do not describe appeasement as just “giving Hitler what he wanted.” Explain why leaders thought concessions might preserve peace, then show why that logic failed.

### From collective security to diplomatic collapse

The failure of appeasement cannot be understood without the failure of collective security. The **League of Nations** was supposed to protect peace after World War I, but by the 1930s it had little power in practice.

The League had no army of its own. It depended on member states to enforce decisions. That was always a weakness, but it became fatal when major powers put self-interest first. The United States never joined, which reduced the League’s authority from the start. When crises came, member states often wanted to avoid the costs of enforcement.

The **Abyssinian Crisis** of **1935–1936** showed this clearly. Italy invaded **Ethiopia**, also called Abyssinia. The League imposed sanctions, but they were limited and ineffective. Oil sanctions were not fully enforced, and Britain and France were unwilling to take military risks. The crisis mattered for Europe because it taught dictators that the rules would not be defended seriously.

It also damaged potential anti-Hitler cooperation. In **April 1935**, Britain, France, and Italy had formed the **Stresa Front** to oppose German treaty violations. This looked promising. But it collapsed quickly. Britain then signed the **Anglo-German Naval Agreement** in **June 1935**, allowing Germany to build a navy up to 35% of Britain’s surface fleet. This undercut common resistance to Germany and showed that even the democracies were not united.

> **Key Term: League of Nations**
> The international organization founded after World War I to preserve peace through cooperation and collective action.

The **Spanish Civil War** from **1936 to 1939** deepened the problem. Britain and France followed a policy of **non-intervention**, officially refusing to intervene. Germany and Italy ignored that spirit and supported **Francisco Franco**. The Soviet Union backed the Republicans. Spain became a testing ground for fascist cooperation and military methods.

This is where students must make a careful distinction. Non-intervention was not identical to appeasement. But in effect it still benefited fascist powers, because the democracies held back while fascist states intervened.

### Rhineland, Anschluss, and Munich: the steps that encouraged Hitler

Not all crises mattered equally. The **remilitarization of the Rhineland** on **7 March 1936** was one of the most significant turning points.

The Rhineland had been demilitarized by **Versailles** and **Locarno**. When Hitler sent troops there, Germany was taking a real risk. The German army was not yet ready for a full war, and a determined French response might have forced a retreat. But France did not act, partly because of political division and partly because it did not want to move without British support. Britain treated the move as Germany entering its “own backyard,” even though it broke treaties.

Why did this matter so much? Strategically, France lost a buffer. Politically, Hitler won a major prestige victory at home. Psychologically, he learned that treaty violations might bring protest but not force.

> **Key Term: remilitarization of the Rhineland**
> Germany’s re-entry of troops into the Rhineland in March 1936, in violation of the Versailles and Locarno settlements.

Next came **Anschluss** in **March 1938**, the annexation of Austria by Germany. This again violated the postwar settlement. Yet Britain and France did not intervene. Some Austrians welcomed union with Germany, which helped Hitler present it as legitimate national self-determination. But from an AP perspective, the key point is not public enthusiasm. It is that another expansion succeeded without meaningful resistance.

Then came the **Sudetenland** crisis. The Sudetenland was part of **Czechoslovakia** and contained many ethnic Germans. Hitler demanded it in **1938**, claiming he wished to protect German speakers. But Czechoslovakia was not a trivial state. It was a functioning democracy, strategically placed, and protected by strong border defenses. Losing the Sudetenland would cripple its security.

At the **Munich Conference** on **29–30 September 1938**, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy agreed to transfer the Sudetenland to Germany. Czechoslovakia was excluded from meaningful participation. Chamberlain returned claiming “peace in our time,” but within months it was obvious that the settlement had not solved the crisis.

> **Key Term: Munich Agreement**
> The 1938 settlement that allowed Germany to annex the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia in the hope of preserving peace.

Munich became the classic symbol of appeasement because it sacrificed a smaller state to avoid war. Yet for analysis, the Rhineland may have been more significant strategically. A strong answer can separate symbolic importance from strategic importance.

> **Test Tip:** If asked for the “best evidence” that Hitler’s aims went beyond revising Versailles, use the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in **March 1939**. That move could not be defended as self-determination for ethnic Germans.

### Distrust, the Soviet Union, and the road to war

After Munich, distrust became even more dangerous. Stalin drew a hard lesson from Western behaviour. If Britain and France were willing to hand over the Sudetenland, perhaps they hoped German expansion would move east against the USSR.

That suspicion mattered because anti-Hitler cooperation needed Soviet participation to be credible. Yet Britain and France distrusted Stalin deeply. They doubted Soviet military effectiveness, especially after Stalin’s purges of the officer corps, and feared making commitments to another dictatorship. So both sides mistrusted the other, and that mutual suspicion blocked a united front.

The final proof that appeasement had failed came on **15 March 1939**, when Germany occupied the rest of **Czechoslovakia**. This showed Hitler was not merely gathering ethnic Germans. He was dismantling states.

Britain and France now stiffened their position and promised to defend **Poland**. But by then, Hitler had stronger options. On **23 August 1939**, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the **Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact**, also called the **Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact**. Publicly it was a nonaggression agreement. Secretly, it divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence, including the partition of Poland.

For Stalin, this pact was partly defensive and partly opportunistic. He had failed to secure a meaningful alliance with Britain and France, so he struck a deal with Hitler instead. For Hitler, the pact removed the danger of immediate Soviet resistance and made invasion of Poland far safer.

> **Key Term: Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact**
> The August 1939 agreement between Germany and the USSR, including secret plans to divide Eastern Europe into spheres of influence.

On **1 September 1939**, Germany invaded Poland. Britain and France declared war on **3 September**. Appeasement had not prevented war. Distrust had not protected anyone. Together they had helped create the conditions in which fascist expansion could succeed.

### How to use this in AP answers

For an SAQ, keep the chain short and specific. For example: Britain and France pursued appeasement because of World War I trauma and military unpreparedness; this encouraged Hitler by showing he could break treaties without forceful resistance.

For an LEQ or DBQ, build a layered argument. One strong structure is:

- appeasement grew from fear, weakness, and anti-communism
- collective security failed in Ethiopia, Spain, and the Rhineland
- distrust between the West and the USSR blocked united resistance
- this helped produce the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the invasion of Poland

A high-level answer should also qualify the claim. Appeasement did not single-handedly cause fascist expansion. Hitler’s own ideology and ambition mattered most directly. But appeasement and distrust made resistance less effective and expansion less risky.

That balance matters. If you say appeasement “caused” everything, the claim becomes too simple. If you say it “had no effect,” you ignore the evidence. The best AP argument is that appeasement and distrust **enabled** expansion by weakening deterrence, dividing opponents, and discrediting the postwar settlement.

## Key Point Checklist

_This article has covered the following key knowledge points:_

- Appeasement meant making concessions to aggressive states to avoid war
- Britain and France pursued appeasement because of World War I trauma, economic weakness, military unreadiness, anti-communism, and doubts about Versailles
- Collective security depended on joint action against aggression but failed in practice
- The League of Nations was weak because it had no army, lacked U.S. participation, and depended on member cooperation
- The Abyssinian Crisis of 1935–1936 exposed the weakness of League enforcement
- The Stresa Front briefly opposed Hitler, but the Anglo-German Naval Agreement weakened united resistance
- Germany remilitarized the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 without military opposition
- Non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War helped fascist powers even though it was not the same as formal appeasement
- Anschluss in March 1938 and the Munich Agreement of 29–30 September 1938 showed further failure to resist Nazi expansion
- Germany’s occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 showed Hitler’s aims went beyond self-determination
- Distrust between Britain, France, and the USSR helped produce the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939
- The invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 began World War II in Europe

## Key Terms and Concepts

- appeasement
- collective security
- League of Nations
- remilitarization of the Rhineland
- Munich Agreement
- Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact


Europe During the Interwar Period - Appeasement and distrust enabled fascist expansion