AQA A-Level Philosophy (7172)

## Learning Outcomes

- Distinguish between propositional knowledge, acquaintance knowledge and ability knowledge
- Explain the tripartite view of knowledge as justified true belief
- Assess whether belief, truth and justification are individually necessary for knowledge
- Explain why Gettier cases challenge the claim that JTB is jointly sufficient
- Evaluate key responses to the Gettier problem, including infallibilism, No False Lemmas, reliabilism and virtue epistemology
- Develop clear evaluative points for 12-mark and 25-mark exam answers

## AQA A-Level Philosophy (7172) Syllabus

For the AQA A-Level Philosophy (7172), you are expected to understand the analysis of knowledge, with a focus on the following syllabus points:

- Know the distinction between **propositional knowledge**, **acquaintance knowledge** and **ability knowledge**
- Explain the traditional **tripartite view** that knowledge is **justified true belief**
- Understand the difference between **individually necessary** and **jointly sufficient** conditions
- Assess whether belief, truth and justification are each necessary for knowledge
- Explain how **Edmund Gettier's** **1963** counterexamples challenge JTB as a sufficient account of knowledge
- Identify the role of **epistemic luck** in Gettier cases
- Understand and evaluate key responses, including **infallibilism**, **No False Lemmas**, **reliabilism** and **virtue epistemology**

## Test Your Knowledge

_Attempt these questions before reading this article. If you find some difficult or cannot remember the answers, look more closely at that area during your revision._

1. What is the difference between propositional knowledge and ability knowledge?
2. Why did philosophers think knowledge could be analysed as justified true belief?
3. How do Gettier cases try to show that JTB is not enough for knowledge?
4. What problem does epistemic luck create for the traditional account?
5. Name two post-Gettier responses and state what each changes.

## Introduction

The knowledge topic asks a basic but difficult question: what does it mean to say that someone **knows** something? In ordinary speech, we often use "know" loosely, but philosophy tries to state clear conditions for knowledge. For AQA, the main focus is **propositional knowledge**: knowledge that a proposition is true, such as "the Earth orbits the Sun" or "water boils at 100°C at standard pressure".

The classic answer is the **tripartite view**: a person knows that _p_ if and only if they believe that _p_, _p_ is true, and they are justified in believing that _p_. This looks neat, but Gettier's challenge shows why a neat definition may still fail.

> **Key Term: propositional knowledge**
> Knowledge that something is the case; knowledge of a true proposition, usually expressed as "S knows that p".

### Types of knowledge and why the topic focuses on propositions

Before analysing knowledge, you need to separate three kinds of knowing.

**Propositional knowledge** is knowledge that a claim is true. For example, "I know that Paris is the capital of France." This is the kind of knowledge the JTB theory tries to analyse.

**Acquaintance knowledge** is knowledge by direct familiarity. For example, "I know Hannah" or "I know the taste of coffee." This is not mainly about holding a proposition.

**Ability knowledge** is knowing how to do something, such as swimming, solving a Rubik's cube or speaking Bengali.

These distinctions matter because students often assume all knowledge works in the same way. It does not. A person may know how to ride a bicycle without being able to state the physics of balance. A person may know a friend well without being able to list every true fact about them. But in epistemology, the set AQA wants you to analyse is propositional knowledge.

> **Key Term: acquaintance knowledge**
> Knowledge by direct familiarity or experience of a person, place, object or quality.
>
> **Key Term: ability knowledge**
> Knowledge-how; knowing how to perform an action or skill.

Why does philosophy focus on propositional knowledge? Because it is the form most clearly linked to truth and reasons. If I say "I know that the exam is on Thursday," that claim can be tested. Is it true? Do I believe it? Am I justified? Those questions make propositional knowledge suitable for precise analysis.

This also explains why the formula is written as **S knows that p**. "S" means the subject, the knower. "p" means a proposition. Philosophy uses this format to keep the structure clear and avoid vague wording.

A further distinction that students must grasp is the difference between **necessary** and **sufficient** conditions. If a condition is necessary, you cannot have knowledge without it. If conditions are sufficient, then having them guarantees knowledge.

For example, truth seems necessary: if a claim is false, it cannot be known. But truth alone is not sufficient. A lucky guess can be true without being knowledge. This is the shape of the whole debate.

> **Key Term: necessary condition**
> A condition that must be present for something to count as an instance of the thing in question.
>
> **Key Term: sufficient condition**
> A condition, or set of conditions, that guarantees something counts as an instance of the thing in question.
>
> **Test Tip:** In short-answer questions, do not just define propositional knowledge. Show that it is the kind of knowledge analysed by the tripartite view. Examiners reward accurate distinctions.

### The tripartite view: knowledge as justified true belief

The traditional account says:

- S knows that p **if and only if**
- S believes that p
- p is true
- S is justified in believing that p

This is called the **tripartite view** because it has three parts.

> **Key Term: tripartite view of knowledge**
> The traditional account that knowledge is justified true belief.
>
> **Key Term: justified true belief (JTB)**
> The claim that a person knows a proposition if they believe it, it is true, and they are justified in believing it.

Why think each condition is necessary?

First, **belief**. If you do not even believe that _p_, it is hard to see how you could know that _p_. Suppose the train leaves at 8:10, and all the evidence supports this, but you insist it leaves at 8:40. Even if the 8:10 claim is true and well-supported, you do not know it, because you do not believe it.

Second, **truth**. False knowledge is a contradiction. If Sam says, "I know the library is open," but it is closed, then Sam does not know. He may think he knows, but knowledge is factive: if you know, what you know must be true.

Third, **justification**. A true belief reached by blind luck does not seem to be knowledge. If I guess there are 1,248 beans in a jar and happen to be right, I have a true belief, but not knowledge. Justification is meant to block accidental correctness by requiring evidence, reasons or good grounds.

This is why JTB seemed attractive. It explains ordinary cases fairly well:

- Tamsin reads in a reliable textbook that **Hamlet** is Shakespeare's longest play.
- She believes it.
- It is true.
- The textbook gives her justification.

So she appears to know it.

However, as soon as you press the theory harder, problems appear. The first set of questions asks whether each condition is individually necessary. The second, more famous question asks whether all three together are jointly sufficient.

Many philosophers accept that belief, truth and justification are each necessary. The deeper problem is whether they are enough.

> **Key Term: justification**
> Good reasons, evidence or grounds for holding a belief.

A useful way to test the theory is to remove one condition at a time.

- True but unjustified belief: a correct guess
- Justified belief that is false: a well-supported mistake
- True and justified proposition not believed by the subject: no knowledge, because the subject does not accept it

These cases support the idea that the three conditions are individually necessary. But that still leaves the harder issue: can all three be present and knowledge still be absent?

> **Test Tip:** When explaining JTB, do not stop at the formula. Add one sentence on why each condition is needed. That turns description into philosophy.

### Gettier and the problem of epistemic luck

In **1963**, **Edmund Gettier** published a short paper arguing that JTB is not sufficient for knowledge. His cases are powerful because they appear to satisfy all three conditions, but still seem not to be knowledge.

> **Key Term: Gettier problem**
> The problem created by cases where someone has justified true belief but, because of luck, still seems not to have knowledge.
>
> **Key Term: epistemic luck**
> Luck involved in a belief being true in a way that prevents it from counting as knowledge.

Gettier's first case is the **job and the ten coins** case.

Smith has strong evidence that Jones will get a job. He is told this by the company president. He also knows that Jones has ten coins in his pocket because he counted them. Smith therefore forms the belief: "The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket."

Unknown to Smith, Jones will not get the job. Smith himself will get it. By coincidence, Smith also has ten coins in his pocket. So Smith's belief is:

- believed by Smith
- true
- justified

Yet most people say Smith does not know. Why not? Because the truth of his belief depends on luck. His reasoning went through a false step, and the belief came out true by accident.

Gettier's second case is the **Ford or Barcelona** case.

Smith has strong evidence that Jones owns a Ford. Smith then forms the disjunctive belief: "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona." Smith has no idea where Brown is. As it happens, Jones does not own a Ford, but by coincidence Brown really is in Barcelona. Again, Smith's belief is justified, true and believed. But it seems wrong to call it knowledge.

The key lesson is not just that odd examples exist. It is that JTB allows **lucky true belief**. That means the three conditions do not fully capture what knowledge requires.

Students sometimes miss the exact force of Gettier's challenge. Gettier does **not** show that belief, truth or justification are useless. He shows that they are not enough when combined. This is why the issue is about **joint sufficiency**, not individual necessity.

You can express the anti-luck intuition like this: knowledge must connect a person's belief to the truth in the right way. In Gettier cases, the link is defective. The belief lands on truth, but by accident rather than proper epistemic success.

This is also why invented examples must be handled carefully in essays. If you use your own example, you must clearly show all three JTB conditions and then explain where luck enters. Otherwise, the example becomes storytelling rather than analysis.

### Responses to Gettier and how to evaluate them

Post-Gettier theories try to remove luck. Some strengthen justification. Others replace justification with a different idea.

**Infallibilism** says that knowledge requires justification so strong that error is excluded. If you can still be wrong, you do not yet know.

> **Key Term: infallibilism**
> The view that knowledge requires justification that guarantees truth or rules out error.

Its strength is obvious: Gettier cases disappear, because the subject's support was never strong enough to make error impossible. But the cost is high. The theory seems too demanding. Most everyday empirical beliefs could be mistaken, so infallibilism risks scepticism. If knowledge requires certainty, we may know very little beyond logic and mathematics.

**No False Lemmas** keeps JTB but adds a fourth condition: the belief must not be inferred from a false premise.

> **Key Term: No False Lemmas (NFL)**
> The view that knowledge is justified true belief that is not based on any false premise or false step in reasoning.

This handles Gettier's original examples well. Smith's reasoning in both cases depends on something false: that Jones will get the job, or that Jones owns a Ford. So NFL blocks those cases.

But NFL has a weakness. Some lucky true beliefs do not seem to rest on a clear false lemma. That means luck can survive even when there is no explicit false premise. So NFL improves on JTB, but may not solve every case.

**Reliabilism** changes the structure more radically. Instead of saying knowledge needs accessible justification, it says knowledge is a true belief produced by a **reliable belief-forming process**.

> **Key Term: reliabilism**
> The view that knowledge is true belief formed by a reliable process, such as normal perception, memory or sound reasoning.

Reliabilism is attractive because it targets the real problem: not simply whether the subject has reasons they can state, but whether the method that produced the belief usually leads to truth. Normal vision in good light is reliable. A broken clock is not. Wishful thinking is not. This explains why some true beliefs count as knowledge and others do not.

It also has the advantage of allowing knowledge where the subject cannot fully explain their justification. Children and animals may know things through reliable perception without being able to give an argument.

However, reliabilism faces problems. One is the **deceptive environment** problem. In a fake-barn area full of convincing barn facades, someone looks at the one real barn and believes "That is a barn." The process may feel normal, but the wider setting makes the truth too lucky. This suggests that reliability is hard to specify: reliable where, under what conditions, and across which range of cases?

Another problem is that reliabilism is **externalist**. A belief may count as knowledge because the process is reliable, even if the subject has no idea that it is reliable. Some philosophers see this as a strength. Others think knowledge should involve reasons available to the knower.

**Virtue epistemology** explains knowledge in terms of **epistemic virtue** or cognitive ability. On this view, knowledge is true belief achieved through intellectual excellence, such as careful observation, good reasoning or intellectual honesty.

> **Key Term: virtue epistemology**
> The view that knowledge is true belief arising from epistemic virtue or cognitive ability rather than luck.

Its attraction is that it captures an important thought: knowledge should be true belief because of the knower's intellectual success. That directly opposes epistemic luck. A person knows when they get the truth through their own good cognitive performance.

But the theory still faces hard cases. If someone uses their abilities well in a misleading environment, do they know? If not, then virtue alone is not enough. If yes, then luck may still be present. So virtue epistemology is a strong anti-luck approach, but not obviously the final answer.

How should you judge these theories in an essay? A strong answer will not simply list strengths and weaknesses. It will ask which theory best explains the anti-luck intuition while still preserving ordinary knowledge claims. That is the balance point:

- JTB fits many normal cases, but fails on Gettier
- Infallibilism blocks luck, but may be too strict
- NFL handles classic Gettier cases, but not all lucky truths
- Reliabilism gives a strong anti-luck account, but struggles with unusual environments
- Virtue epistemology explains epistemic success well, but may still face luck-based objections
  > **Test Tip:** In a 25-mark answer, build a line of argument. For example: "Reliabilism improves on JTB because it targets truth-conducive processes, but fake-barn style cases show that process reliability alone may not remove all epistemic luck." That is better than separate, unconnected paragraphs.

## Key Point Checklist

_This article has covered the following key knowledge points:_

- Propositional knowledge is knowledge that a proposition is true
- Acquaintance knowledge is knowledge by familiarity or direct experience
- Ability knowledge is knowledge-how
- The tripartite view defines knowledge as justified true belief
- Belief, truth and justification are traditionally treated as individually necessary conditions
- A sufficient set of conditions must guarantee knowledge if all are present
- Gettier's **1963** paper challenged the claim that JTB is jointly sufficient
- Gettier's cases show that a person can have justified true belief without knowledge
- The central problem in Gettier cases is epistemic luck or lucky true belief
- Infallibilism strengthens justification so that error is excluded
- No False Lemmas adds the condition that the belief is not based on a false premise
- Reliabilism and virtue epistemology are anti-luck responses that try to explain knowledge more successfully than JTB

## Key Terms and Concepts

- propositional knowledge
- acquaintance knowledge
- ability knowledge
- necessary condition
- sufficient condition
- tripartite view of knowledge
- justified true belief (JTB)
- justification
- Gettier problem
- epistemic luck
- infallibilism
- No False Lemmas (NFL)
- reliabilism
- virtue epistemology


Epistemology - Knowledge