## Facts

- Aramark provided janitorial and related facility services at the Staples Center in Los Angeles and employed workers represented by SEIU Local 1877 under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
- The Social Security Administration sent Aramark a “no-match” letter stating that identifying information for 48 employees did not match SSA records; such mismatches can result from multiple causes, including clerical errors and name changes.
- Aramark suspected immigration-related problems and directed affected employees to provide, within three days, proof they had begun the process of obtaining a corrected Social Security card.
- Seven to ten days later, Aramark terminated 33 employees who did not provide the requested proof within the time set by Aramark.
- The Union filed a grievance alleging the terminations lacked “just cause” under the CBA.
- An arbitrator found no convincing information that any terminated employee was undocumented, concluded Aramark lacked just cause, and awarded reinstatement and back pay.
- Aramark sued in federal district court to vacate the award, arguing enforcement would violate public policy under federal immigration law.
- The district court vacated the award, reasoning that the no-match letter and employees’ noncompliance gave Aramark constructive knowledge it was employing unauthorized workers.
- The Union appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether an SSA no-match letter, combined with employees’ failure to meet an employer-imposed short deadline to address mismatches, gave the employer constructive knowledge that it employed unauthorized workers under IRCA.
2. Whether enforcing the arbitrator’s reinstatement and back-pay award would violate an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy embodied in federal immigration law.
3. Whether, in public-policy review of a labor arbitration award, a court must defer to the arbitrator’s factual finding that there was no convincing evidence of unauthorized status.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment vacating the arbitration award.
- The court held Aramark did not establish constructive knowledge that the terminated employees were unauthorized to work based on the no-match letter and the employees’ responses.
- The court held the public-policy exception did not justify vacatur because enforcement of the award did not require Aramark to violate federal immigration law.
- The court held the district court erred by disregarding the arbitrator’s factual findings and substituting its own inferences about immigration status.
- The effect was confirmation and enforcement of the arbitration award granting reinstatement and back pay.

## Legal Principles

- Judicial review of labor arbitration awards is highly deferential; vacatur on public-policy grounds is limited to conflicts with an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy grounded in law and precedent.
- In assessing the public-policy exception, courts must defer to the arbitrator’s factual findings and may not reweigh evidence or draw contrary factual inferences.
- Under IRCA, constructive knowledge of unauthorized employment is narrowly construed and requires positive information indicating a worker’s unauthorized status.
- An SSA no-match letter, without more, is not proof of unauthorized status and may reflect non-immigration causes such as clerical errors or inaccurate records.
- An employee’s failure to satisfy an extremely short, employer-imposed timeline to resolve a no-match discrepancy is not sufficiently probative, standing alone, to establish constructive knowledge of unauthorized status.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit held that an SSA no-match letter and limited employee noncompliance did not supply the positive information required to establish constructive knowledge of unauthorized employment under IRCA, and that courts must respect an arbitrator’s factual findings when considering the narrow public-policy exception; accordingly, the arbitration award of reinstatement and back pay was enforceable.


Aramark Facility Servs. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1877, 530 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2008)