## Facts

- Carolyn Armor was injured in a June 3, 1991 motor vehicle accident in West Virginia, allegedly caused by a tire failure.
- In 1993, Carolyn and Richard Armor sued Michelin Tire Corporation in both West Virginia state court and Ohio state court; they were represented by Ohio attorneys.
- The West Virginia state action was dismissed in 1994 for failure to prosecute.
- The Ohio attorneys voluntarily dismissed the Ohio action and refiled in federal court in the Southern District of West Virginia.
- Because the Ohio attorneys were not licensed in West Virginia, they retained George E. Lantz as local counsel for the federal filing.
- The federal court granted summary judgment to Michelin, concluding the action was time-barred under West Virginia’s statute of limitations.
- The Armors sued the Ohio attorneys and Lantz for legal malpractice; the Ohio attorneys settled, leaving claims against Lantz based on (1) vicarious liability via joint venture and (2) Lantz’s alleged independent duty to advise that West Virginia was not a viable forum.

## Issues

1. Whether local counsel may be vicariously liable for out-of-state lead counsel’s alleged malpractice on a joint-venture theory.
2. Whether local counsel owed and breached an independent duty to warn that the claim was time-barred in West Virginia, and whether any breach proximately caused the clients’ loss.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed summary judgment for Lantz.
- The record did not support a finding that Lantz and the Ohio attorneys formed a joint venture sufficient to impose vicarious liability.
- Even assuming local counsel had a duty to address limitations and forum viability, the Armors failed to produce sufficient evidence that any omission by Lantz proximately caused their damages.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is reviewed de novo; it is proper when the nonmovant fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element for which the nonmovant bears the burden.
- A joint venture requires an association for profit arising from a contractual relationship with shared contribution and joint control; serving as local counsel, without evidence of profit-sharing and joint strategic control, does not establish vicarious liability for lead counsel’s negligence.
- Local counsel’s duties may be limited by agreement but cannot fall below responsibilities imposed by applicable rules governing the association of local counsel.
- In legal malpractice, proximate cause requires proof that different attorney conduct would have avoided the adverse outcome; where limitations and choice-of-law principles would likely still defeat the underlying claim, causation is not established.

## Conclusion

The court upheld summary judgment for local counsel because the evidence did not show a joint-venture relationship with lead counsel and did not show that any alleged failure by local counsel to identify forum or limitations problems caused the loss of a viable underlying products-liability claim.


Armor v. Lantz, 535 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 2000)