## Facts

- Frederick Ashmore, David Boya, William Simone, and Richard Simeone worked as employees of Northeast Petroleum Division of Cargill, Inc. and related Cargill entities.
- Cargill directed the employees to carry out a discriminatory pricing plan for petroleum products sold to customers, giving lower prices to favored or more “loyal” customers.
- The parties did not dispute (for purposes of the motion) that the pricing plan violated federal antitrust law, including the Robinson-Patman Act’s ban on certain forms of price discrimination.
- The employees refused to implement the pricing plan because they believed it was illegal.
- Cargill terminated the employees after they refused to participate in the pricing conduct.
- The employees sued under § 4 of the Clayton Act seeking treble damages, alleging injury in the form of lost wages and benefits caused by their retaliatory discharge.
- Cargill moved to dismiss the Clayton Act claim, arguing the employees lacked antitrust standing and did not allege “antitrust injury.”

## Issues

1. Whether employees who allege they were discharged for refusing to participate in an antitrust violation have standing to sue for treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act.
2. Whether the alleged loss of wages and employment benefits from a retaliatory discharge can qualify as “antitrust injury” at the pleading stage when the discharge is alleged to be a direct tool for carrying out the antitrust violation.

## Decision

- The court denied Cargill’s motion to dismiss the Clayton Act claim.
- The court held the employees adequately alleged antitrust standing under § 4 based on a discharge allegedly connected to carrying out unlawful price discrimination.
- The court held the complaint sufficiently alleged antitrust injury because the claimed losses (wages and benefits) were plausibly tied to the antitrust-violative conduct the employees refused to implement.

## Legal Principles

- Although § 4 of the Clayton Act is phrased broadly (“any person” injured in “business or property”), a private plaintiff must still satisfy antitrust standing requirements, including alleging “antitrust injury.”
- “Antitrust injury” requires harm of the type the antitrust laws are meant to prevent and that flows from the aspect of the conduct that makes it unlawful (the Brunswick formulation).
- Antitrust standing is evaluated using functional, policy-based considerations (often associated with Associated General Contractors), including the causal link between the violation and the injury, the directness of the injury, the risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment, and whether there are more direct victims who can be counted on to sue.
- Employees are not automatically barred from § 4 standing; standing may be plausible where termination is alleged to be a method of enforcing or protecting an antitrust scheme (for example, removing employees who refuse to carry it out).
- At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asks whether the pleaded connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the claimed damages is sufficient to proceed.

## Conclusion

Ashmore held that employees who alleged they were fired for refusing to implement an unlawful price-discrimination plan stated a viable § 4 claim at the pleading stage because their lost wages and benefits were plausibly caused by, and closely connected to, the alleged antitrust violation rather than being merely an unrelated employment dispute.


Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Division of Cargill, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 759 (1994)