Introduction
Automatism, in legal terms, means action without conscious control. This defense denies the actus reus of an offense, a basic principle requiring a voluntary act for criminal liability. Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992) deals with the specific case of automatism related to driving without full conscious awareness, explaining the difference between internal and external causes. The case sets key rules for this defense, focusing on the proof needed and the type of condition leading to the alleged automatic state. This judgment gives important guidance for using automatism principles in road traffic offenses.
The Facts of Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992)
The case started with a lorry driver in a fatal road accident. He had driven for long periods on motorways, saying he was in a state of “driving without awareness,” a condition claimed to be automatism. The trial judge told the jury to find him not guilty if they thought he was not driving consciously. The Attorney-General sent the case to the Court of Appeal, questioning if this instruction was right. The appeal court found the instruction wrong, leading to the case going to the House of Lords.
Defining Automatism in Law
Automatism requires a total loss of voluntary control. Partial control, less awareness, or bad judgment do not count as automatism. The House of Lords made this clear, saying that less awareness while driving, even if it is a lot, is not enough for a successful automatism defense. This makes a big difference in cases with tiredness, stress, or other things that might affect driving. Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ clearly said that “driving without awareness” is not a separate legal group.
Internal and External Causes: An Important Difference
The House of Lords separated automatism from internal and external reasons. Internal reasons, like a health problem such as epilepsy or diabetes, are usually seen as insanity. External reasons, like a hit to the head or taking a drug, might support a defense of non-insane automatism. This difference is important because a successful insanity defense results in a special decision of “not guilty by reason of insanity,” while a successful non-insane automatism defense leads to a full acquittal. In R v Quick [1973] QB 929, a diabetic’s low blood sugar from insulin was seen as an external cause, unlike high blood sugar from not taking insulin, an internal cause seen in R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287.
Using the Principles in Driving Offenses
The House of Lords in Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992) used these principles in driving offenses. They decided that the claimed “driving without awareness” likely came from an internal cause, maybe tiredness. Such internal things, even if they cause a state like automatism, cannot be a defense unless they are a mental illness. The court noted that normal tiredness or stress while driving does not count as external causes that can support an automatism defense. This makes clear the high standard for showing automatism in driving cases.
The Proof Needed and Medical Evidence
The defendant must show some proof, usually medical, to say they were acting without control. This proof need stops defendants from easily saying they lost control without good backing. Lord Taylor CJ noted the importance of expert medical evidence in backing claims of automatism, especially in cases with complex medical or mental conditions.
Conclusion
Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992) gives clear rules about automatism in driving offenses. The judgment says that just less awareness or “driving without awareness” does not count as automatism. The difference between internal and external causes is very important, with internal causes usually being an insanity defense. The case supports the need for a total loss of voluntary control for a successful automatism defense and shows the importance of good medical evidence in backing such claims. This case is a key part of legal understanding about automatism in driving and has been used in later cases with similar issues, making it more important in legal precedent. The rules set in Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992) give a clear way to judge legal duty in cases where poor consciousness is used as a defense.