## Facts

- A.Z. (husband) and B.Z. (wife) married in 1977 and pursued infertility treatment, including IVF using her ova and his sperm.
- The IVF process produced more embryos than immediately needed; some were cryopreserved at the clinic.
- In 1992, B.Z. gave birth to twin daughters resulting from IVF.
- The clinic required the parties to sign consent forms addressing storage and disposition of embryos, including instructions for the event of the couple’s “separation.”
- On the disposition line, B.Z. wrote that, upon separation, the preembryos should be returned to her for implantation; A.Z. signed forms that included this instruction.
- After the twins’ birth, the marriage deteriorated.
- In 1995, B.Z. used one vial of stored preembryos without A.Z.’s knowledge or consent; no pregnancy resulted.
- During divorce proceedings, one vial containing four preembryos remained in storage; B.Z. sought to implant them, and A.Z. sought to prevent their use.

## Issues

1. Whether the IVF clinic consent forms constituted an enforceable agreement between the spouses governing disposition of the frozen preembryos upon separation or divorce.
2. Whether public policy permits enforcement of an agreement that would compel one genetic contributor to become a parent over that person’s contemporaneous objection.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the Probate and Family Court’s permanent injunction prohibiting B.Z. from using the frozen preembryos.
- The court held the consent forms did not clearly establish a binding agreement between the spouses controlling disposition in the later divorce context.
- The court further held that, as a matter of public policy, it would not enforce an agreement that would require a person to become a parent against that person’s will.

## Legal Principles

- IVF clinic consent forms aimed at directing a clinic’s conduct are not necessarily enforceable interspousal contracts determining rights in divorce.
- An agreement is not enforced where the written terms and execution circumstances do not clearly reflect mutual intent to govern disposition in a later, materially changed context (including divorce).
- Ambiguity in key triggering terms (such as “separation”), absence of clear duration, and questionable mutual assent can defeat enforceability.
- Public policy bars enforcing agreements that would compel genetic parenthood over a contemporaneous objection; the interest in avoiding procreation prevails in that circumstance.

## Conclusion

The court upheld an injunction preventing implantation of frozen preembryos, concluding that the clinic consent forms did not bind the spouses in their divorce and that Massachusetts public policy prohibits enforcing embryo-disposition agreements when enforcement would force an unwilling party into parenthood.


A.Z. v. B.Z., 431 Mass. 150, 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000)