## Facts

- Abrahim Baballah, his wife, and son were Israeli citizens who sought asylum and withholding of removal in the United States based on persecution against Baballah as an Israeli Arab from a mixed Jewish–Muslim family.
- Baballah experienced employment discrimination over many years, including repeated rejection from accounting and other jobs after employers learned of his background and subjected him to ethnic slurs.
- Baballah worked as a fisherman for about a decade and testified to repeated, targeted harassment by Israeli Marines while at sea.
- The Marines allegedly singled him out (and not other fishermen), including circling his boat to destabilize it and fill it with water, firing shots into the air over his boat, throwing objects at him and his crew, and issuing citations resulting in substantial fines.
- The repeated confrontations and fines contributed to severe economic harm, including inability to keep a crew and inability to earn a living.
- Baballah also reported broader hostility and discrimination in his hometown and adverse treatment of family members by government actors, including confiscation of family property and interference with relatives’ opportunities.
- In removal proceedings, the immigration judge found Baballah credible but characterized the harm as insufficient to constitute persecution and denied asylum and withholding; the BIA affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether the credited evidence compelled a finding that Baballah suffered past persecution on account of a protected ground.
2. Whether, if past persecution was established, the government rebutted the resulting presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.
3. Whether the record required relief in the form of asylum eligibility and withholding of removal.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review.
- It held the credited evidence compelled a finding of past persecution based on cumulative physical danger, threats, and severe economic harm.
- It held the government failed to rebut the presumption of future persecution that follows a finding of past persecution.
- The court concluded the family was eligible for asylum, but remanded for the Attorney General’s discretionary decision whether to grant asylum.
- The court held the family was entitled to withholding of removal because the record satisfied the higher “more likely than not” standard.

## Legal Principles

- Under substantial-evidence review, a court must grant relief when the record compels a conclusion contrary to the agency’s determination.
- Where the applicant is found credible, the persecution analysis proceeds on the credited facts; the agency may not reduce severe, targeted harm to “mere harassment” without substantial evidentiary support.
- Past persecution may be shown by the cumulative effect of repeated threats, violence, and severe economic deprivation, particularly when the conduct is targeted and persists over time.
- A nexus requirement is met when the record supports that mistreatment occurred “on account of” protected characteristics such as ethnicity or religion; selective targeting and related discriminatory treatment may evidence motive.
- Harm inflicted by government forces constitutes persecution attributable to the state.
- A finding of past persecution creates a regulatory presumption of future persecution; the government bears the burden to rebut by showing changed circumstances or feasible internal relocation, and failure to present rebuttal evidence defeats rebuttal.
- Asylum requires statutory eligibility plus an exercise of discretion by the Attorney General; withholding of removal is mandatory once the statutory standard is met.

## Conclusion

The court held that Baballah’s credited account of sustained, targeted state harassment and severe economic harm compelled a past-persecution finding and that the government did not rebut the presumption of future persecution, making the family eligible for asylum (subject to discretionary grant) and entitled to withholding of removal.


Baballah v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2003)