## Facts

- Bradford L. Babcock executed a will before marrying Tawn Babcock.
- Article IV of the will devised to Bradford’s then-wife, Tara L. Babcock, “all of my clothing, jewelry, household goods, personal effects, automobiles and all other tangible personal property not otherwise specifically devised,” with the same property passing to his son, Braxton D. Babcock, if Tara did not survive him.
- Bradford later divorced Tara, and at his death he was married to Tawn (though separated).
- Because of the divorce, the will provisions in favor of Tara were treated as void under Fla. Stat. § 732.507(2), so Article IV operated to devise the listed tangible personal property to Braxton.
- Tawn was not mentioned in the will and sought the surviving spouse’s statutory rights, including a determination of “exempt property” under Fla. Stat. § 732.402.
- Florida’s exempt-property statute allows a surviving spouse to claim certain household items and automobiles, but § 732.402(5) excludes property “specifically or demonstratively devised” by will.
- Tawn argued the Article IV transfer to Braxton was a general devise, so the property should remain available for her exempt-property claim.
- The probate court ruled the Article IV gift was a specific bequest and therefore excluded from exempt property; Tawn appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the will’s Article IV gift of “clothing, jewelry, household goods, personal effects, automobiles and all other tangible personal property” was a specific bequest.
2. If it was specific, whether Fla. Stat. § 732.402(5) excluded that property from the surviving spouse’s exempt-property award.

## Decision

- The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the probate orders.
- The court held the Article IV gift was a specific bequest of the decedent’s tangible personal property within the described categories.
- Because the property was specifically devised to Braxton, § 732.402(5) barred treating it as exempt property for Tawn.

## Legal Principles

- A specific legacy (specific bequest) is a testamentary gift of property that is particularly designated and can be satisfied only by delivery of that described property the decedent owned at death.
- A devise may be specific even when it is stated in terms of classes of the decedent’s tangible items (such as household goods and automobiles), so long as the gift is limited to the decedent’s own property of that type and is not payable from general estate assets.
- Under Fla. Stat. § 732.402(5), property specifically or demonstratively devised by will to any devisee is excluded from the exempt-property set-aside for the surviving spouse.
- When a divorce voids a devise to a former spouse under Fla. Stat. § 732.507(2), the will is construed as if the former spouse did not survive, and any contingent devisee takes under the will’s terms.

## Conclusion

Babcock held that the will’s Article IV transfer of the decedent’s tangible personal property—identified by categories such as household goods and automobiles—was a specific bequest to the son, and the surviving spouse could not claim those items as exempt property because § 732.402(5) excludes specifically devised property from the exempt-property award.


Babcock v. Estate of Babcock, 995 So. 2d 1044 (2008)