## Facts

- Sixteen-year-old George William Barb bought a small used gasoline engine from Robert Wallace for $5.
- The engine was mounted on a sturdy base at the time of sale.
- Barb told Wallace he intended to use the engine in a go-cart.
- Barb also told Wallace he was taking a car-mechanics course and had worked on small engines.
- Wallace told Barb the engine could be used in a go-cart because the “shaft was out the side of the engine,” and stated the engine “ran good.”
- Shortly after Barb returned home, he attempted to start the engine while it was on its base.
- Almost immediately upon starting, the engine exploded, causing severe head injuries to Barb.
- Barb and his father sued Wallace in the Circuit Court for Allegany County. Their amended pleading asserted: (1) negligence for failure to warn of a known internal defect, (2) breach of express warranty and implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and (3) the father’s claim for medical and related expenses arising from Barb’s injuries.
- Wallace moved for summary judgment and supported the motion with deposition testimony; the circuit court granted summary judgment on all counts.
- On appeal, Barb and his father challenged only summary judgment on the warranty count and the father’s expenses count, and conceded the negligence count was properly resolved against them.

## Issues

1. Whether summary judgment was proper on the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose claim under U.C.C. § 2-315 where the buyer disclosed his intended go-cart use, but evidence permitted different inferences on whether the buyer relied on the seller’s skill or judgment.
2. Whether the seller’s statements that the engine “ran good” and could be used for a go-cart could constitute an express warranty under U.C.C. § 2-313, creating a triable issue.
3. Whether summary judgment on the father’s claim for injury-related expenses was proper if the son’s warranty claim(s) should proceed.

## Decision

- Affirmed (left undisturbed) summary judgment on the negligence count because appellants did not contest it on appeal.
- Reversed summary judgment on the warranty count, holding that the record permitted more than one reasonable inference on key facts, including reliance and the meaning/effect of the seller’s statements.
- Reversed summary judgment on the father’s expenses count because it was dependent on the viability of the son’s warranty claim(s).
- Remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is improper when the evidence permits more than one reasonable inference on a material fact; choosing among competing inferences is for the factfinder.
- Under U.C.C. § 2-315 (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose), a plaintiff must show: (1) the seller had reason to know the buyer’s particular purpose, (2) the seller had reason to know the buyer was relying on the seller’s skill or judgment, and (3) the buyer in fact relied.
- A buyer’s mechanical training or familiarity with a product does not automatically defeat reliance as a matter of law; whether reliance occurred may remain a jury question based on the circumstances of the sale and the parties’ conduct.
- Under U.C.C. § 2-313 (express warranty), a seller’s affirmative statements about a product’s condition or suitability may create an express warranty if they can reasonably be understood as part of the basis of the bargain; whether statements are warranty terms or mere sales talk can be a fact question.
- A parent’s claim for a minor child’s medical and related expenses is derivative in the sense that it depends on a viable underlying claim tied to the injury; if the underlying claim survives, the expense claim should not be summarily dismissed on that basis alone.

## Conclusion

The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that summary judgment was not appropriate on Barb’s warranty theories because the depositions and surrounding circumstances supported differing inferences about whether Barb relied on Wallace’s judgment and whether Wallace’s statements created express and/or implied warranty obligations; because those disputes required a factfinder, the court reversed summary judgment on the warranty count and the father’s derivative expenses count, while leaving the unchallenged negligence ruling in place and remanding for further proceedings.


Barb v. Wallace, 412 A.2d 1314 (1980)