## Facts

- A divorce judgment awarded the mother custody of the parties’ daughter and ordered the father to pay $25 per week “toward the support of the said minor child.”
- When the child turned 18, the father stopped paying support, believing the support obligation ended at majority.
- The mother filed a contempt motion seeking enforcement, arrears, and attorney’s fees.
- The trial court found the child disabled and ruled the divorce support order continued in effect after the child’s 18th birthday; it ordered payment of arrears.
- The Superior Court affirmed.
- The father appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

## Issues

1. Whether a divorce decree ordering support for a “minor child” remains enforceable after the child reaches age 18.
2. Whether a child’s disability permits continuation of divorce-ordered child support beyond majority absent express statutory authorization.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine sustained the father’s appeal.
- The court held that, under Maine’s statutory scheme, a divorce-based support order for a minor child becomes ineffective when the child reaches majority (18) (or another listed emancipation event).
- The child’s disability did not supply authority to extend the decree’s support obligation beyond majority.
- Post-majority arrearages could not accrue under the divorce support order.

## Legal Principles

- Divorce courts have only the powers granted by statute; authority over custody and child support in divorce is not inherent.
- Maine statutes authorized support orders in divorce only for “minor children.”
- Under 19 M.R.S.A. § 303 (as then in force), a support decree for a child remains in force only until the child reaches majority or becomes otherwise emancipated; the statute does not recognize disability as a basis to continue the decree past majority.
- A statutory support obligation created by a divorce decree cannot be judicially extended beyond the statute’s termination point.

## Conclusion

Because Maine law limited divorce-ordered child support to minor children and specified that such decrees end at majority, the father’s support obligation under the divorce judgment terminated when the child turned 18, even though the child was disabled, and the lower courts erred in enforcing post-majority arrearages under that decree.


Baril v. Baril, 354 A.2d 392 (Me. 1976)