## Facts

- In July 1958, an elderly couple in Christian County, Kentucky were beaten to death by intruders; Willie Mae Barker and Silas Manning were arrested and indicted for murder.
- The prosecution elected to try Manning first, expecting that a conviction would lead Manning to testify against Barker.
- Barker’s trial date was continued repeatedly at the prosecution’s request, resulting in 16 continuances over more than five years.
- Manning underwent multiple trials before being convicted in late 1962, contributing to the delay in Barker’s case.
- Barker was released on bail beginning in June 1959 and remained at liberty for much of the pretrial period.
- Barker did not object to the first eleven continuances; he first moved to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial in February 1962.
- After additional continuances (including those attributed to the illness of a key witness), Barker was tried in October 1963, convicted of murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment.
- State appellate relief was denied; federal habeas relief was denied by the district court and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.

## Issues

1. What standard governs whether a defendant has been denied the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial?
2. Whether the more than five-year delay between Barker’s arrest and trial violated the Sixth Amendment, requiring relief from the conviction.
3. Whether failure to demand a speedy trial constitutes a waiver that bars a later speedy-trial claim.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief.
- The Court rejected fixed time limits for speedy-trial violations and adopted a case-by-case balancing approach.
- The Court set out four factors to be weighed: length of delay, reason for delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant.
- Applying the factors, the Court held Barker’s speedy-trial right was not violated despite an extraordinary delay because Barker largely acquiesced in the continuances, asserted the right late, and failed to show serious prejudice—particularly impairment of the defense.
- The Court rejected a strict “demand-waiver” rule; non-assertion is relevant but not an absolute forfeiture.

## Legal Principles

- Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claims are evaluated by an ad hoc balancing test weighing: (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice.
- A delay that is “presumptively prejudicial” triggers full analysis; it does not automatically establish a violation.
- Reasons for delay are weighted by culpability: deliberate delay to hamper the defense counts heavily against the State; neutral causes (e.g., witness unavailability) count less; valid justifications may reduce the weight against the State.
- Failure to assert the right does not waive it categorically, but it weighs against the defendant and makes a violation harder to prove.
- Prejudice analysis focuses on (1) oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) anxiety and concern, and (3) impairment of the defense, with impairment treated as the most serious interest.

## Conclusion

The Court held that speedy-trial claims require a four-factor balancing test rather than rigid timelines and concluded that, although the delay was extraordinary, Barker’s late assertion of the right and the absence of demonstrated prejudice—especially to the defense—meant the Sixth Amendment was not violated.


Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)