## Facts

- Parents divorced in 1999 under an agreed decree granting Mother sole custody of their two-year-old child and granting Father standard visitation with extended summer visitation.
- After both parents remarried, communication deteriorated and Father alleged difficulty exercising visitation.
- In 2000, Father moved to modify visitation (including summer allocation and a right of first refusal) and to modify child support based on changed circumstances.
- A mental-health evaluator recommended appointing a parenting coordinator to improve communication, address visitation problems, help negotiate agreements, and advise on the child’s best interests.
- Mother testified she had reviewed the evaluator’s recommendations with counsel and was willing to use a parenting coordinator; Father stated he would not object.
- In 2002, the trial court found a substantial, material, and permanent change of circumstances, modified visitation and child support, and entered a separate order appointing a parenting coordinator with described authority.
- Mother appealed, arguing the parenting-coordinator order infringed her substantive due-process rights by delegating custodial decision-making to a third party.

## Issues

1. Whether appointing and empowering a parenting coordinator in a post-divorce custody/visitation dispute violates the custodial parent’s substantive due-process rights by delegating parental or judicial decision-making to a nonjudicial third party.
2. What limits must be placed on a parenting coordinator’s authority to keep custody and visitation determinations within the court’s judicial power and the parents’ lawful decision-making roles.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the modification of visitation and child support.
- The court affirmed the use and appointment of a parenting coordinator, particularly where the parties consented and the appointment served the child’s welfare by improving implementation of court-ordered arrangements.
- The court reversed in part because the coordinator’s authority, as granted, was overly broad and risked displacing the court’s role and the custodial parent’s lawful decision-making.
- The case was remanded for the trial court to clarify and limit the parenting coordinator’s powers to constitutionally permissible, facilitative functions.

## Legal Principles

- A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of a child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by due process.
- The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of children affected by divorce and in facilitating meaningful involvement by both parents when consistent with the child’s best interests.
- A parenting coordinator may be appointed to facilitate communication, assist with logistics, help resolve day-to-day disputes, and make recommendations that remain subject to court review.
- A court may not delegate core judicial functions to a parenting coordinator; binding decisions altering legal custody or the basic visitation framework must remain with the court.
- Orders appointing parenting coordinators must clearly define and limit the coordinator’s authority to prevent conferring effectively unlimited power over the child’s welfare.

## Conclusion

The court upheld parenting coordinators as permissible tools to implement custody and visitation arrangements and reduce conflict, but required strict limits to prevent delegation of custody and visitation decision-making away from the court and the custodial parent’s protected parental rights.


Barnes v. Barnes, 107 P.3d 560 (Okla. 2005)