## Facts

- Barnes opened a checking account using the false name “Charles Smith.”
- Within days, Barnes deposited several U.S. Treasury checks payable to four different individuals whom he did not know.
- The intended payees testified they never received the checks and never endorsed them to Barnes or “Charles Smith.”
- Barnes was charged with (1) possessing Treasury checks stolen from the mails, knowing them to be stolen (18 U.S.C. § 1708), and (2) forging and uttering endorsements, knowing them to be forged (18 U.S.C. § 495).
- Barnes offered no innocent explanation for possessing and depositing the checks.

## Issues

1. Whether a jury instruction permitting an inference of knowledge from unexplained possession of recently stolen property violates due process by reducing the government’s burden of proof.
2. Whether the instruction impermissibly burdens the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by pressuring the defendant to testify to “explain” possession.
3. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1708 requires proof that the defendant knew the checks were stolen from the mails, rather than only that he knew they were stolen.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.
- The Court held that the “recently stolen property” instruction created a permissive inference consistent with due process.
- The Court held the instruction did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.
- The Court held that under 18 U.S.C. § 1708 the government must prove the defendant knew the property was stolen, but need not prove he knew it was stolen from the mails.

## Legal Principles

- A permissive inference is constitutional if there is a rational connection between the proved fact and the inferred fact, and the inference is strong enough under the case’s circumstances to allow a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
- An instruction allowing (but not requiring) the jury to infer knowledge from unexplained possession of recently stolen property may satisfy due process when supported by surrounding circumstances.
- Increased pressure on a defendant to testify resulting from the strength of circumstantial evidence or permissible inferences does not, by itself, violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 1708, the required mens rea is knowledge that the property was stolen; knowledge of the federal jurisdictional circumstance (the theft-from-mail fact) is not required.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld the use of a permissive “recently stolen property” inference to prove knowledge and interpreted § 1708 to require only knowledge that the checks were stolen, affirming Barnes’s convictions.


Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973)