Barnum v. Williams, 264 Or. 71, 504 P.2d 122 (Or. 1972)

Facts

  • Lawrence Barnum rode a motorcycle uphill on Vista Avenue in Portland, Oregon, rounding an extremely sharp left curve on a rainy day.
  • Homer G. Williams drove an автомобиле downhill on the same road, which was divided into two lanes by a yellow center line positioned closer to Williams’s curbside.
  • The jury could have found the impact occurred on or near the center line, possibly on Barnum’s side.
  • The jury also could have found Barnum was riding on the center line and leaning into the turn; Williams, traveling in a narrow downhill lane near the center line, braked after becoming apprehensive about a collision, slid across the center line, and struck Barnum.
  • Barnum sued Williams for personal injuries, alleging negligence.

Issues

  1. Whether the trial court erred by instructing that violation of a safety statute is “negligence in and of itself,” but may be excused if, under all attending circumstances, the statute “cannot or should not be complied with” by a person exercising reasonable care.
  2. Whether, under Oregon law, negligence per se for statutory violations permits jury consideration of excuses tied to the reasonable-person standard.

Decision

  • The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the defense verdict and judgment for Williams.
  • The court held the challenged statutory-negligence instruction, including the “excuse” component, was not substantively erroneous.
  • The court concluded Barnum did not show the instructions misled the jury or caused prejudice warranting reversal.
  • In Oregon, violation of a safety statute is generally negligence per se, an exception to the usual rule that negligence turns on reasonable prudence under the circumstances.
  • A statutory violation may be excused when the circumstances support a finding that a reasonably careful person could not or should not have complied with the statute.
  • An “emergency” may support an excuse for noncompliance, but excuses are not limited to emergencies.
  • Jury instructions on statutory negligence are adequate if, read as a whole, they preserve the per se effect of statutory violations while permitting the jury to decide whether recognized circumstances excuse strict compliance.

Conclusion

The court upheld a statutory-negligence instruction that treated safety-statute violations as negligence per se but allowed the jury to excuse noncompliance when, under the attending circumstances, a reasonably careful person could not or should not have complied, affirming the defense verdict.