Facts
- The company in question was managed by two directors, Mr. Barron and Mr. Potter, who were also the sole shareholders.
- Due to persistent disputes between the directors, the board was unable to form a quorum and thus could not make decisions.
- Mr. Barron sought to resolve the impasse by calling a shareholders’ meeting to appoint additional directors.
- Mr. Potter objected to this action, leading to a disagreement about the legality of such a meeting in the absence of board functionality.
- The court determined that Mr. Barron, acting as a shareholder, was entitled to call a legitimate meeting to appoint new directors under these deadlocked circumstances.
Issues
- Whether shareholders are entitled to act where the board of directors is unable to function due to deadlock.
- Whether a shareholder can call a meeting and appoint additional directors when the board is incapable of making decisions.
- Whether such shareholder action is subject to company constitutional requirements and legal standards.
Decision
- The court held that when the board is unable to act due to deadlock, the ongoing power to manage the company's affairs reverts to the shareholders.
- It was found lawful for Mr. Barron, as a shareholder, to call a meeting and appoint new directors in order to resolve the deadlock.
- The rule permits shareholder intervention only in clear cases of board inability and where proper procedures for meetings are followed.
- Ordinary management remains the function of the board, and shareholder involvement is limited to circumstances where the board is genuinely incapable of action.
Legal Principles
- Directors' powers are delegated by shareholders and function as agents of the shareholders.
- When the board is unable to carry out its duties, the ultimate authority to act reverts to the shareholders, as the original source of power.
- The shareholders’ power to intervene is limited to situations where the board cannot function and must comply with the company's constitutional rules and broader legal requirements.
- This principle is restricted and does not grant shareholders authority to override board decisions under normal circumstances.
- Clear corporate governance mechanisms to resolve board deadlocks are necessary to help maintain stable management and minimize reliance on shareholder intervention.
Conclusion
Barron v Potter affirms that shareholders retain residual power to act when the board is deadlocked and unable to manage the company, emphasizing the board's role as agent and the shareholders’ ultimate authority, provided shareholder intervention is executed according to required procedures and only in cases of true board inaction.