## Facts

- General Motors employees filed four actions under FLSA § 16(b) seeking overtime, liquidated damages, and attorney’s fees for time spent in pre- and post-shift activities on the employer’s premises.
- The claimed time included walking to and from workstations, changing clothes, receiving orders, obtaining and returning tools, washing after work, and certain lunch and rest periods.
- The employees’ theory relied on Supreme Court interpretations treating such “portal” activities as compensable working time under the FLSA.
- While the cases were pending, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, which generally eliminated FLSA liability for specified preliminary and postliminary activities unless made compensable by contract or established custom.
- General Motors moved to dismiss, asserting the Act removed both liability and judicial power to hear such claims.
- The employees challenged the Act as unconstitutional; the United States intervened to defend the statute.
- The district court dismissed the complaints (after granting leave to amend); plaintiffs stood on their pleadings, and final dismissal orders were entered.

## Issues

1. Whether Congress could retroactively eliminate FLSA causes of action for noncontractual preliminary and postliminary activities without violating the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
2. Whether Congress could withdraw or limit jurisdiction over pending portal-to-portal suits without violating Article III.
3. Whether the Portal-to-Portal Act’s substantive and jurisdictional provisions were a valid exercise of congressional power over federal statutory rights and the jurisdiction of lower federal courts.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaints.
- The court upheld the constitutionality of the Portal-to-Portal Act as applied to the pending suits.
- The court held that Congress could eliminate liability for the asserted claims and bar their adjudication where the claims were purely statutory and not grounded in contract or custom.
- The court rejected the arguments that the Act effected an unconstitutional taking or an improper legislative invasion of the judicial function.

## Legal Principles

- Statutory causes of action created by Congress may be modified or withdrawn, including as applied to pending cases, absent a final judgment or an independent contractual right.
- Retroactive economic legislation affecting statutory liabilities does not violate due process if it represents a rational legislative response to legitimate regulatory concerns.
- Congress has broad authority to define and limit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts; restricting jurisdiction over a class of claims is generally permissible when Congress changes the underlying substantive law rather than directing outcomes in specific cases.
- Eliminating liability for certain activities unless made compensable by contract or established custom is a permissible legislative line-drawing choice when rationally related to regulating commerce and limiting unforeseen statutory exposure.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit sustained Congress’s retroactive narrowing of FLSA coverage for portal-to-portal activities and approved the accompanying jurisdictional limitations, holding that employees asserting only noncontractual statutory claims lacked a vested right that prevented Congress from changing the law governing pending suits.


Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948)